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UNIVERSITITEKNOLOGI MARA (UiTM) 
An Introduction 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (formerly known as MARA Institute of Technology) 
is Malaysia's largest institution of higher learning. It had its beginnings in 1956 as 
Dewan Latihan RID A, a training centre under the supervision of the Rural Industrial 
Development Authority (RIDA). 
Nine years later Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) Act, 1965 provided for a change 
of name from Dewan Latihan RIDA to Maktab MARA (MARA College). The Act 
also defined a new role for the MARA College - to train Bumiputras (literally it 
means "the sons of the soil" - ie the indigenous people) to be professionals and 
semi-professionals in order to enable them to become equal partners with other 
ethnic groups (ie the former migrants, especially the Chinese and Indians) in the 
commercial and industrial enterprises of the nation. 
In 1967 Maktab MARA was renamed Institut Teknologi MARA(ITM) (or MARA 
Institute of Technology). In August 1999, the Institute was upgraded to university 
status and named Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM). 
As pan of the government's affirmative action policies, UiTM provides education 
and training in a wide range of sciences, technology, business management and 
professional courses to 56,408 full-time students in 2000. Another 3,156 have 
enrolled for off-campus courses. In addition, there are 7,725 students in distance-
learning and flexible-learning programmes. 
The main campus stands on a 150-hectare piece of land on a picturesque hilly area 
of Shah Alam, the state capital of Selangor Darul Ehsan, about 24 kilometres from 
the city of Kuala Lumpur. 
The Universiti has also established branch campuses in the various states of the 
Federation: Sabah (1973), Sarawak(1973), Perlis (1974), Terengganu (1975), Johor 
(1984), Melaka (1984), Pahang (1985), Perak (1985), Kelantan (1985), Penang 
(1996), Kedah (1997) and Negeri Sembilan (1999). 
The Universiti currently offers 184 programmes conducted by 18 Faculties. These 
programmes range from post-graduate to pre-diploma or certificate levels. More 
than half of these are undergraduate and post-graduate programmes, while diploma 
programmes account for an additional 39%. Some of the post-graduate programmes 
are undertaken in the form of twinning programmes, through collaboration with 
universities based overseas. 
The following 18 Faculties currently run programmes in the University: 
Accountancy; Administration and Law; Applied Science; Architecture Planning & 
Surveying; Art & Design; Business & Management; Civil Engineering; Education; 
Electrical Engineering; Hotel & Tourism Management; Information Technology 
& Quantitative Science; Mass Communication; Mechanical Engineering; Office 
Management & Technology; Performing Arts; Science; Sport Science & Recreation. 
In addition to faculties there are 17 'academic centres' to cater various academic, 
business, technological and religious needs of the campus community. They are 
Extension Education Centre (PPL); Language Centre; Centre for Preparatory 
Education; Resource Centre for Teaching and Learning; Total Quality in UiTM 
(CTQE); Department of Academic Quality Assurance & Evaluation; Computer 
Aided Design Engineering Manufacturing (CADEM); Malaysian Centre for 
Transport Studies (MACTRANS); Text Preparation Bureau; Bureau of Research 
& Consultancy; Malaysian Entrepreneurship Development Centre (MEDEC); 
Islamic Education Centre; Centre for Integrated Islamic Services; Business & 
Technology Transfer Centre. 
THE FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION AND LAW, UiTM 
The Faculty of Administration and Law (formerly known as the School of 
Administration and Law) was founded in 1968. It began as a centre offering British 
external programmes, the LLB (London - External) and the Chartered Institute of 
Secretaries (now Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators). The only 
internal programme offered then was the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Local Government (DPALG). In 1978 the LLB (London - External) programme 
was terminated and replaced by the current internal LLB programme. The LLB is 
a three-year academic degree course based on the structure of the undergraduate 
law programmes normally offered in the British universities. Unlike most of the 
British LLB programmes, however, the LLB at the Faculty is conducted on a 
semester system. In 1982 the Faculty introduced a one-year LLB (Hons) programme 
towards which graduates of the LLB could advance their studies. The LLB (Hons) 
is a professional and practice-oriented programme that provides training to students 
for their career in the legal practice as Advocates and Solicitors. The delivery of 
the curriculum for this course adopts the method and strategy of simulated or 
experiential learning. Because of the unique experience it provides to students in 
their legal training this course has acquired wide recognition and acceptance among 
the Malaysian public. 
The Faculty of Administration and Law enjoys strong connections with the legal 
profession, particularly the Malaysian Bar, and the industry. It takes pride in 
continually developing pioneering options in its degree programmes, both at the 
academic and professional levels. In 1995 the Faculty introduced the degree of 
Bachelor in Corporate Administration (Hons) to train young and bright Malaysians 
to hold office as Company Secretaries. In the pipe-line are some new courses -
Bachelor of Law and Management (Hons), Bachelor of Administrative Science 
(Hons), Masters of Law and Executive Masters in Administrative Science. 
The Faculty currently comprises some 70 academic staff from both the disciplines 
of law and administration. It has about 600 students reading for the LLB and LLB 
(Hons) and 500 students reading for the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Bachelor in Corporate Administraiion (Hons). The Faculty admits about 200 
students each year. 
Main Entrance to Shah Alam Campus 
EDITORIAL NOTES 
This law journal had a long period of gestation in the Faculty. There were several 
attempts in the past, by individuals or the faculty collectively, to bring about its 
parturition. It is no easy task to initiate an academic journal, regardless of the 
discipline it represents. It demands a high degree of commitment in time, energy 
and attention. It calls for an intense love of labour for scholarship among a critical 
mass of the faculty members, either in the editorial board or as article contributors. 
But, at long last, this journal has arrived. 
Many factors led to this successful launch. The recent elevation of this institution 
to university status created its own impetus. Our strong law programme and its 
capable teachers demanded, and will benefit from, this specialist forum for aca-
demic debate and analysis. There is support within the legal profession and among 
our many distinguished alumni for such a journal, too. We are delighted by the 
synergy and collaborative goodwill the notion of a journal has evoked. So, we 
were able to marshal much expertise and experience to bring out this inaugural 
issue of the Journal. 
Academic faculty at UiTM are part of the worldwide network of academia. We 
must participate in discussions and debates over issues that are not only of direct 
academic and professional concern but also of importance to the general public. A 
journal such as this facilitates reflective and disciplined participation. In doing so, 
it helps the Faculty, and the University, to undertake its noble role in serving the 
general community. 
A learned journal is one of the major measures by which the weight and prestige of 
an institution are judged. It reflects the institution's maturity and ability to manage 
and conduct its specialist discipline. It reflects a confidence among its faculty to 
offer themselves to be evaluated in the open market place of ideas, and it serves 
notice of the faculty's readiness to serve the community at large. This Journal, in 
no small measure, marks the coming of age of the Faculty. 
The Journal functions also as a meeting point for law teachers and practitioners 
who share a common interest in various areas of law. It provides them a source of 
information on the current and topical issues in their specialised areas. It creates a 
forum for the exchange of ideas and for engaging in discourse over sometimes 
intricate and often vexed legal issues. Much is gained by the legal fraternity, as 
well as the legal system, through such engagements and encounters. 
Law teachers, as members of the broader academic community, are aware that it is 
no longer tenable for them to function solely within their traditional ivory towers, 
isolated from the reality of the world outside. For career and professional advance-
ment, and for taking their rightful role in the community, no academic can confine 
herself to her classroom or departmental audience. She must reach for a wider 
audience. The recognition (or lack of it) that she gains from her peers, both within 
and without the discipline, will speak for her standing and credibility in the com-
munity, both scholarly and otherwise. This Journal will serve as one channel for 
the Faculty members to reach that wider audience. 
There are relatively few academic legal journals in this country. Most existing 
legal publications cater for the professional needs of legal practitioners. One rami-
fication of this is that there are few discourses on theoretical and abstract legal 
issues. Yet these issues are important for the fuller appreciation and development 
of the law and the legal system, by the legislature, the reform bodies and the courts. 
This Journal will try to answer this need and stimulate discussions on issues that 
are of interest and relevance to the academic and broader communities. 
The labour and skill required for this Journal to thrive will challenge the staff of 
the institution and the supporters of this initiative among the profession and the 
wider community. We hope the Journal sails well in fair winds. 
Our wish is that Malaysia's legal profession, its legal academic circle and the many 
students and practitioners of law in this country and elsewhere will benefit from 
this forum for analysis and reform. We hope this Journal makes an important con-
tribution to debate on vital legal matters in our society. We hope, too, that our quest 
for self-expression and critical reflection among the members of the legal academia 
will be assisted by this Journal. It is with great pleasure and some satisfaction at 
the completion of this worthy task that we complete this inaugural Editorial. 
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THE TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT 
ON THE STRAITS STATES POWERS: A CASE 
STUDY ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA1 
by DR. MUSRIFAH SAPARDIRUSTAM* 
Introduction 
Significant questions of control over navigation by foreign shipping only arise in 
those straits used for international navigation which cannot be traversed without 
entering the territorial waters of straits States, as in the case of the Straits of Malacca.2 
The law relating to straits used for international navigation therefore became more 
important as States increasingly claimed 12 miles territorial seas.3 The Third United 
Nations on the Law of the Sea Convention (1982 LOSC) introduced the new regime 
Lecturer, Faculty of Administration and Law, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia, PhD (Newcastle Upon 
Tyne), LLM (Hull), ADIL (1TM). 
The Straits of Malacca lie between the south-eastern part of the Andaman Sea and south-western pan of the 
South China Sea, creating a link between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. To be mote precise, the Straits 
nm for 520 nm down the western side of Pen insula Malaysia, around and just beyond Singapore, ending in the 
SouthChina Sea, The Straits are officially bordered by Malaysia and Indonesia, although a small portion falls 
under the Singaporean jurisdiction, see "Joint Statement by the Governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore", 16 November 1971. In the Straits of Malacca, problems 
of navigational safety and marine pollution from ships are getting serious. These concerns have become more 
urgent in modem times because of the need to protect and preserve the marine environment, particularly 
against the increasing dangers posed by the types of cargo being transported by sea and the ever increasing 
high traffic density in the Straits of Malacca, In addition, the pollution from ships has resulted in physical 
damage to marine habitats and organisms. It also affects human health, social activities and economic welfare. 
Discharges of harmful substances by commercial vessels arc particularly serious in an enclosed sea, such as 
the Straits of Malacca, which are relatively narrow and shallow. 
Malaysia claimed 12 nm territorial sea in 1969, sees 3(1) of Malaysian Territorial Waters Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Ordinance, No 7,1969, Indonesia claimed 12 nm territorial sea in I960, see Article 1(2) of Indonesian 
Territorial Sea Ordinance, No 4, i960. As a result of both coastal Stales bordering the Straits of Malacca 
having a 12 nm territorial zone, the narrowest portion of the Straits fall entirely under the Malaysian and 
Indonesian territorial jurisdiction. See discussion in Lewis M Alexander, "Geographical Perspectives on 
International Navigation", in J M V Dyke, et al, (ed). International Navigation: Rocks and Shoots Ahead? 
(Law of the Sea Institute Univ. of Hawaii Honolulu 1988)73, 
Article 3 of the 1982 LOSC, see UN.Doc.A/CONF.62/122 (1982); 21 International Legal Materials (1982) 
126L This claim now represents a clear majority of States* practice and has now been made uniform for the 
Parties to the 1982 LOSC. As of 30 December 1998, more than 70 countries are parties to the 1982 LOSC, 
They include, inter alia, Malaysia, Singapore. Indonesia, and the United Kingdom. Malaysia ratified the 1982 
LOSC on 2 October 1996, Indonesia ratified on 3 February 1986, Singapore ratified on 17 November 1994, 
and the UK acceded on 25 July 1997. The 1982 LOSC came into force on 16 November 1994. 
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of transit passage to govern navigation through straits that fall within territorial 
sea which would previously have been governed by the rules of innocent passage.'' 
Transit passage may be described as a compromise between innocent passage* and 
freedom of navigation6. It is restricted to "straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and 
another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone".7 If the strait is formed 
by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, "transit passage shall 
not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or 
through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to 
navigational and hydrographical characteristics".8 Within the Straits of Malacca, 
this excludes the Strait of Johore which is used only by local traffic.9 The principle 
of transit passage does not affect the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the coastal 
States in other respects.10 
Malaysia was initially reluctant to accept any change from a regime of innocent 
passage, because it was concerned that the transit passage regime would significantly 
reduce its power to protect itself, inter alia, against marine pollution from vessels.11 
In the light of this concern and continuing calls for special treatment to be accorded 
to the Straits of Malacca," it is appropriate here to consider briefly the extent of 
relevant changes introduced by the transit passage regime and whether Malaysiai's 
concern were justified. In addition, it is appropriate to outline the general principles 
4 Part lit (Straits Used for International Navigation: Articles 38-45)of the I9S2 LOSC. See J [Charney, "Entry 
into force of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea" 35 Virginia Journal of International Law (Winter 
1995) 383. 
5 Article 14(4) of the 1958 TSCCf, Article 38 of the 1982 LOSC. 
6 UN Doc, A/AC.I18/SC.WSR.66, p. 2, See discussion in E D Brown, The International Law of the Sea, vol. 1, 
Introductory Manual, (Dartmouth 1994) p 86. 
7 Article 37 of the 1982 LOSC. 
8 Article 38(1) of the 1982 LOSC. 
9 The Strah of Johore is separated by a causeway of only 3,465 feet (0.656 miles) between Malaysia and Singapore, 
see Malaysia in Brief, 1994, p 1. 
10 Article 34(1) of the 1982 LOSC. "The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation 
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the 
exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air 
space, bed and subsoil", 
11 Indonesia is another strait Stale which was initially reluctant to accept any change from innocent passage, see 
D P O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea Vol 1 (Clarendon Press Oxford) 3)9. See also detailed 
discussion in para. 1.3, on the development and concept of the transit passage regime, 9-16. and the impact of 
transit passage regime on straits States powers in para, 1,5, below at 21-24. 
12 The Malaysian government is concerned about problems of navigational safety and marine pollution from 
commercial vessels, both with respect to its legal powers and the cost of enforcement and the provision of 
navigational facilities as discussed in above n 1 at 1. These concerns are stressed in the ,;Keynote Address by 
the former Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs", YB Daluk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, at the international 
Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, (14 June 1994), Kuala 
Lumpur, 1-9. See also "Opening Speech by the Malaysian Minister of Science, Technology and Environment", 
Datuk Dr Law (ling Ding, at the International Conference on Malaysia Seeks New Maritime Role, Lloyds 
Ship Manager, (September 1994: Supplement), 5-9, The said Minister also calls for "a new Convention relating 
to the Straits of Malacca", in an interview after the First Session of the Second Informal Association of the 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting on the Environment, see H Kaur. "Malaysia Needs 
for New Pact on Straits", The Star, (13 September 1995). 8. 
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that govern the relationship between strait States powers to regulate foreign shipping 
and freedom of navigation. 
A brief summary of the main elements of innocent passage will now be given 
before examining the development of the concept of transit passage in more detail. 
The rules governing transit passage will then be discussed, followed by an analysis 
of the extent to which the change from innocent passage to transit passage has 
affected straits States' powers over commercial shipping. 
The Regime of Innocent Passage 
Innocent passage is defined in the 1982 LOSC: 
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with 
this Convention and with other rules of international law.13 
Under the equivalent provision of the of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial 
Sea (1958 TSC), this rather general test did not require the commission of any 
particular act, only that the passage was not, for whatever reason, prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.I4 The exception that proved the 
rule, as Churchill and Lowe point out, was chat the mere act of fishing where 
prohibited would render passage non-innocent.15 
The 1982 LOSC adopts a different approach and provides a detailed list of activities 
which will render passage non-innocent,16 The relevant activities are: 
(i) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind,17 
(ii) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft,IK 
(iii) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device,19 
(iv) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention,30 
13 Article 19(1) of the 1982 LOSC 
14 Article 14(4) of the 1958 TSC. It provides "[Pjassage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall lake place in conformity with these articles and 
with other rules of international Law". 
15 Article 14(5) of the 1958 TSC. See R R Churchill and A V Lowe, Law of the Sea, (Manchester University 
Press Manchester 1988) 72. 
16 Articles I9(2)(a) to (I) of the 1982 LOSC. Other activities are, (a) any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial i ntegrity or political independence of the coastal Stale, or in any other manner in violation 
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (c) any act aimed at 
collect ing informal ion to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal Stale; (d) any act of propaganda 
aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State and (gj the loading or unloading of any commodity, 
currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal 
State. See also D R Rolhwell, "Navigational Rights and Freedoms in the Asia Pacific Following Entry into 
Force of the Law of the Sea Convention" , (Spring 1995), 35 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law, 592. 
17 Article 19(2)(b) of the 19S2 LOSC. 
18 Article l9(2Xe)of the 1982 LOSC 
19 Article l9(2Xf)ofthe 1982LOSC. 
20 Article 19(2Xh)ofthe 1982 LOSC 
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(v) any fishing activities,21 
(vi) the carrying out of research or survey activities,22 
(vii) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other 
facilities or installations of the coastal State,73 
(viii) any other activity not having direct bearing on passage.24 
These detailed provisions were made in order to produce a more comprehensive 
and objective definition of innocent passage. The result is that the coastal States 
are allowed less scope for interpretation and therefore less opportunity to abuse 
their powers by preventing innocent passage in the territorial sea.35 The mere 
presence or passage of ships in the territorial sea of a coastal State, cannot now be 
characterised as an act prejudicial to the coastal State unless the ships are engaged 
in one or more of the listed activities. There is, apparently, no need to show that 
such activities are actually prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State. Churchill and Lowe suggest that the right of innocent passage has 
been widened to the advantage of foreign ships, because they can only lose the 
right of passage if they positively commit one of the listed acts.26 
On the other hand, the listing of activities also narrows down the right of innocent 
passage. Any act that falls within the list will automatically render the passage 
non-innocent, whereas under Article 14(4) of 1958 TSC, it would have been 
necessary to show that such activities actually prejudiced the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal States.27 
In addition, the list of activities has been made very broad by the insertion of 
Article 19(2)0) of 1982 LOSC, which includes as a non-innocent activity, "any 
activity not having a direct bearing on passage". On this point, O'Connell suggests 
that: 
The Draft Convention (1980), by linking innocence explicitly with the list of 
subject matters within coastal State competence, could have the effect of 
reversing the presumption of innocence. If passage is innocent until the 
commission of a prejudicial act, the burden of proving non-innocence could 
logically rest on the coastal State, which should be required to establish the 
fact and its prejudicial implications. But if no overt act need be committed for 
passage to be non-innocent then logically the burden of proving innocence 
would tend to shift the ship.23 
21 Article 19(2Xi)ofthe 1982 LOSC. 
22 Article 19(2)(J)of the 1982LOSC. 
23 Article I9(2)(k) of the 1982 LOSC 
24 Article 19(2)11) of the 1982 LOSC 
25 Churchill and Lowe, above n 15 at 72. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 O'Connell, above n Uat273. 
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Thus, coastal States lost a degree of discretion under the 1982 LOSC provisions 
on innocent passage but, arguably, this discretion was ill-defined and difficult to 
apply clearly. Under the 1982 LOSC, there is probably a greater advantage given 
to coastal States with regard to innocent passage in that their burden of proof is a 
great deal less and, if O'Connell is correct, could even shift from the coastal States 
altogether. In this light, Malaysia's reluctance to accept a move to the more restrictive 
regime of transit passage away from innocent passage is even more understandable, 
since it would probably have gained greater powers of control over foreign shipping 
than before once the 1982 LOSC came into effect.29 However, the key issue, in the 
sense of its practical importance for protecting the Straits of Malacca from marine 
pollution, is not so much the question of what constitutes innocent passage as 
such, but the power of the coastal States to regulate the conduct of the passage. 
In this regard, the 1985 TSC provided merely that: 
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the 
laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with these 
Articles and other rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws 
and regulations relating to transport and navigation. 
However, this provision was open to interpretation and there was considerable 
uncertainty as to the precise powers of coastal States, not least in the area of 
environmental protection.30 Article 21(1) of the 1982 LOSC, in contrast, contains 
much more detailed provisions and specifies the following relevant areas in which 
coastal States may exercise control:31 
(i) the safety of the navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic,33 
<ii) the protection of navigational aids and facilities or installations.33 
(ii) the protection of cables and pipelines.3'1 
(iv) the conservation of the living resources of the sea.35 
(v) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the 
coastal State.36 
29 The 1982 LOSC has entered into force on 19 November 1994. See discussion in Charney, above n 3 at 381-
404. See also further discussion in paras. 1,3, and 1.5, below at 9-16 and 21-24, respectively. 
30 See P W Birnie and A E Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (Oxford University Press Oxford 
1992)274-275. 
33 Except para (h) with respect to the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations of the coastal State which is not involving control on navigational safety or marine 
pollution from vessels by coastal States. 
32 Article 2l(0(a)of the 1982 LOSC, Through the IMO's supervision, coastal States may implement various 
means to control navigation by way of international conventions and agreements, including the development 
of Vessels Traffic Services (VTS). The I MO Guidelines for VTS defines VTS as "any service implemented by 
a competent authority, designed to improve safety and efficiency of traffic and the protection of the environment", 
see " [MO Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services", IMO Resolution A.578(14), 20 November 1985. See alsoG 
Plant, "International Legal Aspects of Vessel Traffic Services", 14 Marine Policy (1990). 73. 
33 Article 21(lXb) of the 1982 LOSC. 
34 Article 21(1 )(c) of the 1982 LOSC, 
35 Article 21(1 )(d) of the 1982 LOSC. 
36 Article 21(1 )(e) of the 1982 LOSC. 
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(vi) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution thereof.37 
(vii)marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys.38 
Foreign vessels exercising the right of innocent passage are required to comply 
with all such laws and regulations.39 The explicit grant of these powers is to be 
welcomed by coastal States, but is subject to certain very important limitations. 
First, the laws may not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of 
foreign ships, unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules 
or standards.40 Secondly, coastal States must give due publicity to all such laws 
and regulations to foreign vessels, passing through their territorial sea.41 Thirdly, 
coastal States must not hamper the innocent passage of foreign vessels, except in 
accordance with the 1982 LOSC, nor impose requirements that have the practical 
effect of denying or impairing the exercise of innocent passage."1 Fourthly, coastal 
States may only exercise very limited criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship.43 
Apart from the first limitation, all of these are derived from the provisions of the 
1958 TSC and the previous State practice and represent no significant change. On 
the other hand, the listing of legislative competence represents a clarification and, 
arguably, an extended interpretation of the coastal States' powers with regard to 
environmental protection and control of marine pollution. Again, the improvement 
of the innocent passage provisions in favour of coastal States may help to justify 
Malaysia's reluctance to move away from innocent passage towards an acceptance 
of transit passage.44 
In addition to the power of coastal States to regulate the conduct of innocent passage, 
the 1958 TSC gave them the power to suspend innocent passage under the following 
conditions, namely, that the suspension was temporary, affected only specified 
areas of their territorial sea, was not discriminatory and was essential for the 
protection of their security.45 Such suspension could take effect only after having 
been duly published.46 This power to suspend has been retained unchanged by the 
1982 LOSC.47 
37 Article 210X0 of the 1983 LOSC. 
38 Article 21(1 )(g) of the 1982 LOSC. 
39 Article 21(4) of the 1982 LOSC; Article 17 of the 1958 TSC. 
40 Article21(2)ofthe 1982LOSC. 
41 Article 21(3) of the 1982 LOSC. 
42 Article 24(1) of the l982LOSC;Cf. Article 15(l)of the IWSTSC.SeealsoJoseADeYturriaga.S'raiwLW 
for International Navigation: A Spanish Perspective. (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht: London 1991) 251. 
43 Article 27 of the 1982 LOSC: Article 19(1) of the 1958 TSC. The exceptions to this rule are provided in 
Articles 2 IH)(a) to (d) of the 19S2 LOSC and Articles !9(lXa) to (d) of the 1958 TSC. 
44 Straits States do have legislative competence under transit passage, but it is not expressed in such wide terms 
as discussed in para. L4.2. on rights and duties of straits States, below at IS-21. 
45 Article 16(3)ofthe 1958TSC. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Article 25(3) of the 1982 LOSC 
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With regard to international straits, the power to suspend under the 1958 TSC was 
specifically withheld in straits used for international navigation.48 In the case of 
the 1982 LOSC, the issue has been subsumed by the introduction of the transit 
passage regime which has the same effect by giving no power to suspend.49 In this 
respect at least, the strait States have not lost any previously held power to control 
foreign shipping. 
Another rule that has remain unchanged under the 1982 LOSC is that coastal States 
must not levy charges upon foreign ships by reason only of passage through the 
territorial sea,50 except for specific services rendered to the ships.51 It is not clear, 
however, whether this prevents coastal States from charging foreign ships for 
infrastructure costs or for services rendered generally to all shipping, such as 
navigational aids or communication systems. 
Development of the Concept of Transit Passage Regime 
The evolution of the law on straits used for international navigation and its 
relationship with territorial sea rules under the 1982 LOSC is important as an aid 
to interpreting relevant provisions. Unlike several Parts of the 1982 LOSC, the 
wording of Part III, which contains the rules and regulations for straits used for 
international navigation, is not based upon any of the Conventions on the Law of 
the Sea adopted by the First United Nations Conference in Geneva 1958.5! However, 
this does not mean that the provisions in Part III of 1982 LOSC do not have any 
antecedents. A concept similar to transit passage has been discussed for a long 
time and the debate over navigational rights in straits used for international 
navigation, in general, goes back as far as the 17th century when Grotius and 
Selden wrote about the claim of freedom of the seas versus the closed sea and the 
extent of coastal States' jurisdiction." 
The first attempts to codify the rules on straits were made by the Institut de Droit 
International between 1894 to 191254 the International Law Association at Brussels 
48 Article 16(4) of the 1958 TSC. See O'Connel I, above n II at 314-317. 
49 Artic1e38(l)offhel982LOSC. 
50 Article26(l)ofthe 1982LOSC;Article lS(l)ofthe 1958TSC 
51 See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 24 February 27 April 1958 Official Records, 
vol. 1-VII, United Nations Doc.A/Conf. 13/37-43. The four Conventions are as follows; 
(a) Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 
(b) Geneva Convention on High Seas. 
(c) Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
(d) Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the living Resources on the High Seas. 
53 H Grotius, Mare Liberum. The Free Sea, 1609, English translation by R.V.D, Magoffin and J.B. Scoll, (eds), 
(Oxford University Press, American Branch New York 1916) 37-46; J Selden, Mare Gausum, The Closed 
Sea, Lugdani Batavorum, 1635, Lib. 1, Chapter XX. See also discussion in Rothwell, above n 16 at 594; DL 
Larson, Security Issues and the Law ofthe Sea, (University Press of America 1994)81-83. 
54 O'Connell was of the view that "the Institat decided tocreate a special category of straits in which territorial 
rights and rights of passage would coincide. This followed from the definition of straits as being those which 
did not exceed double the territorial sea in width. The waters of such straits would be territorial waters, but 
precisely in order to avoid Interruption of passage, it was proclaimed thai transit was to be free", see O'Connell, 
aboven II at301. 
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between 1895 to 1910" and the Hague Peace Conference in 1907s* in their proposed 
rules relating to territorial waters. They went no further than suggesting that ships 
should have the right of innocent passage through straits.57 World War I interrupted 
the work of Institut de Droit International respecting the legal status of straits, but 
the issue was debated again at the International Law Association.51* This Conference 
marked another attempt to formulate treaty provisions. When the Hague 
Codification Conference met, the question of passage through straits was dealt 
with in the context of the right of passage of warships in the territorial sea.59 The 
Hague Codification Conference considered the question of territorial sea, including 
straits used for international navigation, in its Second Sub-Committee Meeting, 
which decided: 
Under no pretext whatsoever, may the passage even of warships through straits 
used for international navigation between the parts of the high seas be inter-
fered with ... It is essential to ensure in all circumstances the passage of mer-
chant vessels and warships through straits between the parts of the high seas 
and forming ordinary routes of international navigation.60 
However, no treaty was agreed at the Conference. The issue of the law of straits 
used for international navigation was fully reviewed in a learned treatise written 
by Erik Bruel in 1930 and was later published in English in 1947,61 This treatise 
was the first comprehensive study of matters pertaining to international straits. 
Bruel argued that the regime governing straits used for international navigation 
should be separated from that of innocent passage through territorial seas, and 
should give greater emphasis to the freedom of navigation.62 
In 1949, the law on straits used for international navigation was discussed and 
clarified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case.6* 
The Court held: 
States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used 
for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the 
previous authorisation of a coastal State, provided the passage is innocent. 
55 ibid at 302. 
56 Ibid at 302-303. 
57 ibid at 301-302. See also S N Nandan and D H Anderson, "Straits used for International Navigation: A 
Commentary on Pan HI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982", British Yearbook of 
International Law, (Fiov/de London 1589) 159-204. 
58 O'Connell, above n 11 at 303 
59 Ibid at 304-305. 
60 Conference on the Progressive Codification of International Law, Publications of the League of Nations V: 
Legal Questions, (1930), Supplement' Official Documents, 234-253. 
61 E Bnie\, International Straits: A Treatise to international Law, vol.1 (The General Legal Position of International 
Straits) and vol. II (Straits Comprised by Positive Regulations), (Sweet &. Maxwell London 1947), 
62 Ibid at 38-40. 
63 ICJ Reports, (1949) 2&. 
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Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right 
for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace. 
This case was clearly focused on the question of whether warships were entitled to 
the right of innocent passage, and it deals with the issue of passage through 
international straits by reference to "innocence". It may be interpreted as meaning 
that the Court believed that only a right of innocent passage applied to international 
straits. However, their evident concern to safeguard warship passage might suggest 
that, had they been asked a more general question, in other words, what precise 
rights pertained to shipping in international straits, they would have supported a 
right of navigation which was stronger than mere innocent passage. At the very 
least, this interpretation is not excluded by the Court's judgment. 
The 1958 TSC treated international straits as subject to the regime of innocent 
passage by making no specific reference to them, except that the normal right of a 
coastal State to suspend innocent passage could not be exercised in territorial sea 
falling within international straits.*1 In this respect, the 1958 TSC does not differ 
significantly from the draft Articles proposed by the International Law Commission 
(ILC).6S 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there had been a long standing preference 
amongst States towards protecting freedom of navigation through international 
straits to a greater degree than would normally occur under the regime of innocent 
passage in ordinary territorial sea. This pressure had been quite consistent and, 
despite reservations by straits States such as Malaysia, apparently irresistible.*6 It 
64 Article 16(4) of 1958 TSC as previously discussed in para. 3.2. above at 48. See also discussion by J N Moore, 
*The Regime of Straits and theTTiird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", 74 American Journal 
of International Law, (1980)90. Moore observes that "one of the shortcomings of the 1958 TSC is that with 
the exception of a single clause providing for 'no suspension' of innocent passage in the straits, it fails to 
differentiate meaningfully between passage of ships through the territorial sea in general and transit through 
straits". A further exception to the rules of innocent passage is demonstrated through Slate practice. The 1958 
TSC required submarines to navigate on the surface and show their flags when passing through territorial seas 
and in the absence of an express exception, this should be interpreted to include strails used for international 
navigation, see Article 14(6) of 1958 TSC. However, Slate practice appears to support the right of submarines 
to subnavigate through international strails. This point is discussed by Churchill and Lowe where the State 
practice "is consistent with the travaux ptvparatoires" of the 1982 LOSC; "it underlines the importance of 
transit passage for submarines, which must normally pass through the territorial sea on the surface", see 
Churchill and Lowe, above n 13 at 93. See also J B R I Langdon, T h e Extent of Transit Passage: Some 
Practical Anomalies", Marine Policy, vol. 14, No. 2, (March 1990) 132-136. This right for submarines to 
subnavigate now appears to be included under the transit passage regime. See further discussion in para. 3.4.), 
below at 17. 
65 See Draft Article 17(4) of the ILC in the Report of the International LawCommission to the General Assembly, 
Doc.A/3159: Report of the ILC covering the work of its eighth session, 23 A pril-4 July 1956 in Yearbook of 
she International Law Commission, vol. [I, 1956, United Nation, New York, 1957, 273. Draft Article 17(4) 
provides that "there must be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits normally 
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas". 
66 After the Malaysian claim of 12 nm territorial sea in 1969, Malaysia asserted that the Straits of Malacca 
should not be classified as an international strait, but at the same time, that they were subject to the regime of 
innocent passage, see Clause 5 of the 1971 Joint Statement of the Governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore, 16 November 1971, It provides lhat,"[T] he Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia 
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was probably inevitable, therefore, that a protecting regime governing passage 
through international straits would be called for in the Third United Nations 
Conference on Law of the Sea. However, it was always likely to be a contentious 
issue. 
In particular, coastal States had been increasingly concerned over the passage of 
ships in international straits in the light of increasing traffic density and the 
environmental risks posed by their cargoes. Since there are 118 international straits, 
the issue affected a great number of coastal States. It also affected the major maritime 
States, whose interests in promoting freedom of navigation tended to conflict with 
the interests of the straits States and which were threatened by the intended extension 
of territorial sea rights to 12 miles.67 These tensions were particularly strong where 
the straits were of special strategic importance but the coastal States were not 
major maritime powers, such as the Straits of Malacca between Malaysia and 
Indonesia.63 Hence it was clear that proper provision needed to be made for the 
governance of international straits, but that any regime agreed would need to 
accommodate the differing objectives of straits States and user States. 
During the negotiations at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 
Malaysia and seven other straits States, namely, Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, 
Morocco, the Philippines, Spain and Yemen, urged that international straits that 
fell within the territorial sea should be treated in the same way as ordinary territorial 
agreed that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not international strails, while fully recognising their use 
for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage ...*'. However. Singapore was 
silent on this point, merely taking note of the position of the other two nations. In response to this statement, 
many countries including the United Kingdom, the USSR (now Russia), Australia and Japan addressed Notes 
to both Malaysia and Indonesia insisting that the straits were an international waterway in which shipping was 
free to navigate. The Notes of Protest were made in March 1972, see O'Connell, above n 110 at. 319 and 
Yaacov Venzberger, "The Malacca-Singapore Straits: The Suez of South-Easl Asia", Conflict Studies, 1988, 
5. Strictly speaking, this statement appears to mean that Malaysia would respect for freedom of navigation, 
but the Malaysian government intended to retain their power to suspend shipping and deny passage to submerged 
submarines. However, it is not clear from the governmental statement of the time was in fact what Malaysia 
was intended. According to O'Connell, "both governments assured foreign missions (embassies) that they had 
no intention to impede innocent passage of foreign ships, and their intention was only to regulate navigation 
so that the danger to the coastal States bordering Ihe Straits of Malacca can be minimised", see O'Connell, 
above n II at 319. This desire to control navigation was demonstrated in 1992, when Malaysia and Singapore 
strongly and successfully resisted the proposed passage of Japanese ships carrying plu ionium passing through 
the Straits of Malacca, On this occasion, it was considered that the risk would be too great for the straits States 
to bear if a collision were to occur. See also Reuters, S November 1992; M. Kusumaatmaatdja, "Overcoming 
Navigational Hazards and Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Exercise of Rights 
and Duties of Littoral States", Paper presented at the International Conference on the Straits of Malacca: 
Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, (14-15 June 1994) 1-39; J M V Dyke, "Legal and Practical 
Problems Governing International Straits", Paper presented at the Kuala Lumpur Workshop on the Straits of 
Malacca, (24-25 January 1995)36. 
67 Rothwell. above n 16 at 594. See also Larson, above n 54 at 81-83, 
6S Other examples include the Straits of Hormuz between Iran and Oman; Ihe Straits of Gibraltar between Morocco 
and Spain and. Babel Mandeh which is bordered by the State of Yemen, Republic of Djibouti and Ethiopia, 
See M Leifer, Malacca. Singapore and Indonesia, (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Alphen aan den Rijn 1978) R K 
Ramazani, 77ie Persian Gulf and Straits of Horniui, (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Alphen aan den Rijn 1979) S C 
Ivmei, The Strain of Gibraltar and Tlie Mediterranean, (Sijthoff & Noordhoff Alphen aan den Rijn 1980) 
New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Documents, vol. II, compiled and edited by R R Churchill, M Nordquist 
and S Houston Lay, (Oceana Publications Dobbs Ferny New York 1973) 887. 
68 
THE TRANSIT PASSAGE REGIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT 
ON THE STRAITS STATES POWERS: A CASE STUDY ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA 
sea.M For example, Mr, Ruiz Morales from Spain argued during a debate in 1973 
as follows: 
Straits used for international navigation are an integral part of the territorial 
sea in so far as they lay within territorial waters. Any attempt to set up sepa-
rate regimes for the territorial sea and for straits would clearly violate the 
fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the coastal State over its territo-
rial sea.70 
Malaysia joined other straits States in proposing that the regime for straits should 
remain essentially unchanged, which would include having no right to suspend 
innocent passage with respect to the Straits of Malacca.71 This argument however, 
was opposed by Mr. John Norton Moore, the representative from the United States. 
Mr. Moore pointed out that "the community interest at stake in international straits 
is far more vital than simply the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea".72 
Thus, the position of straits States was that they should retain as much control as 
possible over navigation which would be protected by continuing with the innocent 
passage regime, whereas the major maritime powers sought greater freedom of 
navigation on the basis of the strategic and commercial importance of international 
straits. In the end, the regime that was developed was that of transit passage, which 
was designed to give greater protection to freedom of navigation than innocent 
passage.73 It is notable that the transit passage regime was proposed by the United 
Kingdom, which is both a strait and a major maritime State.74 
This apparent victory for the user States was not entirely accepted by strait States, 
however, and some made reservations when signing the 1982 LOSC.75 Nevertheless, 
69 See UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC. 1I/L1S (27 March 1973). See also Moore, above n 66 a! 93; R W Smilh and J A 
Roach, "Navigational Rights and Responsibilities in International Straits: A Focus on the Straits of Malacca", 
Paper presented at the International Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st 
Century, (14-15 June 1994) 5. 
70 Statement by Mr Ruiz Morales from Spain, UN Doe. A/AC.138/SC. II/SR.60 (1973) ISS. 
71 UNCLOS III. Official Reconis, vol. Ill, 1973, p. 194. See also O'Connell, above 1) 11 al 320, 
72 Statement by Mr John Norton Moore, the United States Representative to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of the Seabed and the Ocean Root Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 2 April !973, see US Press 
Release So. 32 (73), 3 April 1973, 2. The United Stales has taken a particular interest in the international 
straits regime, see W M Reisman. "The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International 
Law Making", 74 American Journal of International Law, (1980) 48. 
73 The rules on transit passage is discussed in para. 3.4. below at 16-20. These rules are contained in Part 111 of 
1982 LOSC which deals with straits used for International navigation, and the specific provisions on the 
transit passage regime are contained ins 2 (Articles 37-44 of 1982 LOSC). Rules on territorial sea and contigous 
zone are contained in Part II of 1982 LOSC, with provisions on the innocent passage ins 3 (Articles 17 to 26 
of 1982 LOSC). See also Rothwell. above n 16 at 588; Nandan and Anderson, above n 59 at 159; S Rosenne 
and Louis B Sohn, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, vol. V, (Nijhoff 
Dordrecht 1982) R PAnand, "Transit Passage and Overflight in International Straits", 26 Indian Journal of 
International Law, (1986) 72-105. 
74 See UN. Doc. for UK proposal on transit passage regime at the Law of the Sea Conference, in Draft Articles 
on the Territorial Sea and Straits. (3 July 1974), submitted to Committee II by the UK, 3 Official Records, 
UNCLOS 183. UN.Doc. A/CONE 62/C.2/L3,1974. 
75 For example, the Statement made by Iran accompanying its signature to the 1982 LOSC on 10 December 
1982 and Yemen Declaration of 10 December 1982, in the U.N. Status of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of tin: Sea, 18 and 29. 
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Malaysia accepted the transit passage regime when it signed the 1982 LOSC on 10 
December 198276 and ratified on 2 October 1996, although it did assert that the 
Straits of Malacca should be considered as a special case for some purposes.71 
Transit passage is now the predominant regime governing international straits and 
has been accepted by many parties to the 1982 LOSC, such as the newly acceded 
United Kingdom.7* 
What follows is an analysis of the particular rules or law governing transit passage. 
76 Upon signing the 1982 LOSC, the Malaysian representative, H E Tan Sri fjhazali Shade staled: "[T)he 
Constitut ion (Convention) incorporates... a new concept in relation 10 straits used for in lernalional navigation, 
namely the concept of transit passage. Lying as we do. on one side of the narrow and shallow Straits of 
Malacca, which is one of the most important and busiest international waterways in the world ... Malaysia 
particularly welcomes those provisions in the Convention which seek 10 ensure the safety of navigation as 
well as the protection of the marine environment- In this respect, together with Indonesia and Singapore, our 
neighbours sharing the Straits of Malacca, we have reached a common understanding with major user States 
of the Straits on measures that coastal States may adopt in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention", see the Third UNCLOS, Official Records, vol, XVII, Plenary Meetings Documents, 192nd 
Meeting, 9 December 19S2, 117-118. 
77 See, the Malaysian Declaration Upon Ratification of the Convention of Law of the Sea 1982 on 2 October 
1996. It is to be noted that the signature and ratification of the 1982 LOSC by Malaysia were subject 10 
requiringsomespecial exceptions to be applied to the Straits of Malacca, see the Letter dated 28th April from 
the Representative of Malaysia to the President of the Conference (29 April 1982), Third UNCLOS, Official 
Records, vol. XVI, Summary Records of Meetings, 11 Session, New York, 8 March-30 April 1982, pp. 250-
251 and the Declaration 5 of the Malaysian Declaration Upon Ratification of the Convention of Law of the 
Sea 1982. Malaysia made two relevant declarations when ratifying the 1982 LOSC. First, Malaysia declared 
that "[l]n view of the inherent danger entailed in the passage of nuclear-powered vessels or vessels carrying 
nuclear materia] or other material of a similar nature and in view of the provision of Article 22, paragraph 2 of 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the right of the coastal State to confine the passage of such 
vessels to sea Lanes designated by the State within its territorial sea, as well as that of Article 23 of the 
Convention, which requires such vessels to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures as 
specified by international agreements, the Malaysian Government, with all of the above in mind, requires the 
aforesaid vessels to obtain prior authorisation of passage before entering the territorial sea of Malaysia until 
such time as the international agreements referred to in Article 23 are concluded and Malaysia becomes a 
party thereto. Under all circumstances, the flag State of such vessels shall assume all responsibility for any 
Loss or damage resulting from the passage of such vessels within the territorial sea of Malaysia", see Declaration 
4 of the Malaysian Declaration Upon Ratification of the Convention of Law of the Sea 1982,2 October 1996. 
Secondly, Malaysia's requirement that special considerations should apply to the question of undeikeel clearance 
(UKC)in the light of the peculiar geographic and traffic conditions of the Straits of Malacca. Declaration 5 
reiterating a statement made April 1982 from the Representative of Malaysia to the President of the Conference 
(29 April 1982). This requirement was acknowledged as being possibly inconsistent with Article 233 of the 
L982 LOSC, see Declaration 5 of the Malaysian Declaration Upon Ratification of the Convention of the Law 
of the Sea and Letter dated 28 April from the Malaysian Representative in Third UNCLOS. Official Records, 
vol, XVI, Summary Records of Meetings, Uth Session, New York, 8 March-30 April 1982, pp. 250-25). 
Howeverh the special UKChasnow been adopted under the auspices of the IMO. 
77 The UK government has acceded the 1982 LOSC on 25 July 1997, 
77 For an overview of the provisions in Parr HI (Straits used for international Navigation) of the 1982 LOSC, see 
V D Bordunov, "The Right of Transit Passage Under the 1982 Convention", 12 Marine Policy, (1988) 219; 
Nandan and Anderson, above n 59 at 159. previously during the negotiations at the Third United Nations Law 
of the Sea Conferences, in a Letter dated 28 April 1982 from the Representative of Malaysia to the President 
of the Conference (29 April 1982). This requirement was acknowledged as being possibly inconsistent with 
Article 233 of the 1982 LOSC, see Declaration 5 of the Malaysian Declaration Upon Ratification of the 
Convention of the Law of the Sea and Letter dated 28 April from the Malaysian Representative in Third 
UNCLOS. Official Records, vol. XVI, Summary Records of Meetings, 11 th Session, New York, 8 March-30 
April 1982,250-251. However, the special UKChasnow been adopted under the auspices of the IMO. 
78 The UK government has acceded the 1982 LOSC on 25 July 1997. 
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The Law Relating to Transit Passage Regime 
The transit passage regime in the 1982 LOSC lays down the rights and 
responsibilities of both straits States and user States.79 It applies to all ships and 
aircraft, thus encompassing merchant ships and warships, including submarines, 
as well as overflight for both civil and military purposes. In this article, attention 
will focus on ships as representing the most important actors in questions of 
navigational safety and marine pollution.80 
The rights and duties of user States and straits States will now be looked at in more 
detail. 
Rights and duties of user States 
The rights and duties of foreign ships passing through straits used for international 
navigation under the new legal regime enunciated in 1982 LOSC are as follows: 
Foreign ships are entitled to exercise the freedom of navigation which must 
not be impeded through international straits.81 They enjoy the freedom of navi-
gation solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit.82 While 
doing so, they must proceed without delay through or over the strait.83 This 
right of transit passage applies to submarines because their "common prac-
tice"81 of transiting through international straits while submerged satisfies the 
requirement that passing vessels refrain from activities other than those "inci-
dent to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit". ** 
Although there is no requirement of "innocence", ships exercising the right to 
transit passage are subject to certain restrictions.86 They must refrain from any 
threat or use of force against the sovereignty of the straits States87 and activities 
other than those incidental to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious 
transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or distress.ss If ships do not so 
79 For an overview of the provisions in Part 111 {Straits used for international Navigation) of the 1982 LOSC, see 
V DBotdunov, "The Right of Transit Passage Under the 1982 Convention", 12 Marine Policy, (1988)219: 
Nandan and Anderson, above n 59 at 159, 
80 The provisions on warships and other government ships will not be analysed in this article since the discussion 
and analysis on types of ships are limited and concentrated on commercial vessels, see Introduction, above n 
I a l l . 
81 Article38(l)oflhe 1982LOSC. 
82 Article 38(2) of the 1982 LOSC 
83 Article 39 (l)(a) of the 1982 LOSC 
84 See Churchill and Lowe, above n 15 at 93. See also H Caminos, T h e Legal Regime of Straits" in United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (MartinusNijhoff Dordrecht 1989) JiaBingBing, A Study on 
the Regime of International Straits, (unpublished Ph.D thesis), 1995, and W V Dunlap, Transit Passage in the 
Russian Attic Straits, 
85 Article 39( 1 )(c) of the 1982 LOSC. 
86 Articles 39( I )(b),(c) and (d) of the 1982 LOSC. 
87 Article 39<lXb)of the 1982 LOSC. 
88 Article 39dXc)of the 1982 LOSC. 
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refrain, they lose the right of transit passage and fall under the general regime of 
innocent passage.89 In the former case, i.e. the threat or use of force, the right to 
innocent passage would almost certainly be lost.90 In the latter case, the right of 
innocent passage would probably be lost because the right is based on "passage" 
as well as "innocence".91 
More specifically, foreign ships, while in transit, must comply with generally 
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea 
including the International Convention on Collision Regulations (COLREG1972).92 
In addition, all ships in transit shall comply with generally accepted international 
regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution from ships.93 These international regulations, procedures and practices 
are generally taken to be those international conventions implemented under the 
auspices of the IMO.94 It should be noted that this duty to comply with international 
safety and pollution standards is independent from States* national legislation. 
Rights and duties of straits States 
Rights and duties of States bordering straits used for international navigation 
contained in the 1982 LOSC are as follows: 
Straits States have no right to impede transit passage of foreign ships passing 
through straits used for international navigation.9* The right of transit passage 
cannot be hampered, denied or suspended.96 Any danger to navigation must 
89 Article 38(3) of the 1982 LOSC. The Article provides thai "any activity which is not an exercise of the right of 
transit passage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention". See also 
Churchill and Lowe, above n 15 at. 91. 
90 Article 19(2)(a) of the 1982 LOSC. 
91 It will fall under Article 19(2X0 of the 1982 LOSC which includes in the list of prejudicial activities, "any 
other activity not having a direct bearing on passage". See previous discussion in para. 1.2. where the 1982 
LOSC adopts a different approach and provides a detailed lists of activities which will render passage non-
innocent, above at 3-9. See also Churchill and Lowe, above n 15 at 91 and detailed discussion in para, 1.5. on 
the impact of transit passage regime on straits States powers, below at 21-24. 
92 Article 39(2Xa) of the 1982 LOSC. 
93 Article 39<2Xa) and (b) of the 1982 LOSC, 
94 This is not entirely uncontroversial. It is because the question of whether the IMO rules and standards are 
generally accepted ones was discussed in the "Report of the 67th Conference by the Committee on Coastal 
State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution", held at Helsinki, 12-17 August 19%. In this Report, it is 
acknowledged that there is some disagreement on whether the IMO Conventions should automatically be 
considered to be the relevant international rules and standards, but the more common view appears to be that 
they should be so considered, see International Law Association Yearbook, Report of the 67th Conference by 
the Committee on the Coastal Stale Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution, held at Helsinki, 12-17 August, 
166 and 170. It is stated that the common ground for these references was the attempt to harmonise national 
laws with generally accepted international rules. This approach can be accepted and, in this article, it will be 
assumed thai they are. It is also to be noted that Article 39(2) (a) of the 1982 LOSC refers specifically to 
COLREG 1972. In addition, vessels must refrain from research and survey activities during passage unless 
prior authorisation is obtained from the States bordering ihe straits (Article 40 of the 1982 LOSC). 
95 Article 38(1) of the 1982 LOSC. 
96 Article42(2)and44ofthe 1982LOSC. 
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be notified publicly." However, the straits States have the right to adopt laws 
and regulations relating to transit passage through straits in relation to safety 
of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic by establishing sea lanes 
and traffic separation schemes.98 They may also adopt laws and regulation 
relating to prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution by giving 
effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, 
oily wastes and other noxious substances in the straits.*9 These laws must not 
have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing transit passage 
nor must they be discriminatory.100 As noted above, the duty of foreign ship-
ping to comply with international safety and pollution standards arises inde-
pendently from any coastal State national legislation.101 However, it is also to 
the advantage of straits States to implement international rules and standards 
in their national legislation so that they become directly enforceable by the 
coastal State authorities. Otherwise, violations could only be pursued through 
diplomatic channels.101 
In order to promote safe passage of ships passing through international straits, 
the straits States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes.103 
However, there are certain restrictions on this power. The sea lanes and traffic 
separation schemes must conform with generally accepted international regu-
lations and adopted under the auspices of the IMO.104 Straits States must indi-
cate all sea lanes and traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by 
them clearly on charts, and ensure that those charts are made publicly avail-
able.105 
In addition, straits States may adopt laws and regulations with respect to the 
prevention of fishing including the stowage of fishing gear.106 In these mat-
ters, there is no reference to the application of international standard, but na-
tional legal requirements must not discriminate foreign ships exercising their 
rights of transit passage nor may they have the practical effect of impairing 
the right of transit passage. 
Beside the rights given to straits States under international law, they also have 
considerable responsibilities towards foreign vessels passing through straits used 
for international navigation. There is a general duty to publicise any dangers to 
97 Article 44 of Ihe 1982LOSC. 
98 Artic1e42(l)(a)ofthe 1982LOSC 
99 Articles 42<]Xa) and <b) of the 1982LOSC 
100 Article 42(2) of ihe 1982 LOSC 
101 See Churchill and Lowe, above n 15 at 92. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Article 41(1) of ihe 1982 LOSC. 
104 Article541(3)and41(4)ofihe 1982 LOSC. 
105 Anicle41(6)ofthe I982LOSC 
106 Article42(l)(c)ofthe 1982L0SC. 
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navigation and a number of specific services that straits States are expected to 
provide. However, Article 43 of the 1982 LOSC provides that both straits and user 
States must co-operate on establishing and maintaining navigational safety aids 
and other improvements in aid of international navigation in international straits.107 
In addition, they must co-operate for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from ships.103 Article 43 is capable of being interpreted more widely than 
merely the provision of technical consultations, and may include other matters 
such as technical assistance and funding.109 There is no specific provision relating 
to the levying of charges against foreign ships transiting through straits used for 
international navigation. Article 26 of the 1982 LOSC, which provides that charges 
cannot be levied for passage through territorial sea save for services rendered, 
applies to innocent passage, but it must also apply mutatis mutandis to transit 
passage. This is especially so since the provision is phrased negatively against the 
coastal State and freedom of navigation is more protected by transit passage than 
by innocent passage and in any case is reflected in State practice, such as that of 
Malaysia and the United Kingdom. 
The Impact of the Transit Passage Regime on Straits States 
Powers 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the transit passage regime is largely 
similar to that of innocent passage, save that it provides a greater degree of freedom 
of navigation.""Under the 1982 LOSC provisions, coastal States have fewer powers 
to control and restrict ships passing through straits used for international navigation. 
The question remains, however, how significant these changes are in practice. 
Rules on qualifying ships 
On the face of it, transit passage gives greater allowance to foreign shipping than 
innocent passage because it does not impose a test of innocence in order to qualify 
for the right.1" However, the new formulation of innocence in the 1982 LOSC 
appears to give coastal States less power to designate passage as non-innocent 
than before since a particular act must be committed,"2 This is qualified by the 
inclusion of "any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage"113 although 
107 Article 43(a) of the 19S2 LOSC 
108 Article 43(b) of the 1982 LOSC. 
109 See United Nations Conference on Economic Development (UNCED) Working Group proposing 1MO as 
medium lo carry the responsibility as discussed in MEPC 37/10,18 January 1995. 
110 See discussion in ED Brown, above n<S at 93.TTB Koh, Transit Passage through Straits used for International 
Navigaiion ihe need for co-operation between straits States and user Slates", Paper presented al the International 
Conference on ihe Straits of Malacca: meeting the challanges of the 21- century, (14-15 lune 1994)6. 
111 Article 38(1) of 19S2 LOSC 
113 See Churchill and A V Lowe, above n 15at91,TTB Koh, above n 110 at 1. 
113 Article 19(2)(i) of the 1982 LOSC. 
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it would seem that such activity would still have to be shown to be prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal States.11" In transit passage, on the 
other hand, there is no such qualification and loss of right to transit appears to 
occur automatically if the ship does anything that is not "solely for the purpose of 
continuous and expeditious transit".113 It is questionable, therefore, whether in this 
respect at least, there is any significant reduction in the coastal States' powers. 
Rules on non-suspension of passage 
All foreign ships enjoy the right of transit passage,116 without having to satisfy a 
general test of innocence. As in innocent passage through international straits,117 
transit passage cannot be suspended for any reason by the straits States.118 Straits 
States can only act to exclude ships from transit passage if they threaten or use 
force, or act in a way not pertaining to passage.119 However, in practice, this is 
probably not so different from the regime of innocent passage and, in any case, 
loss of the right to transit passage means that a ship would automatically become 
subject to the rules of innocent passage.120 
Rules on legislative competence 
Scope 
Under the transit passage regime, straits States are permitted to make and adopt 
laws for purposes of navigational safety and or for the prevention of marine 
pollution, subject to the proviso that they must not discriminate or have the effect 
of denying, impairing or hampering transit passage.121 This is similar to the 
legislative powers given to coastal States regarding innocent passage, but is 
expressed in a less detailed fashion.122 Under the innocent passage regime, coastal 
States have the legislative competence to adopt laws and regulations with reference 
to the navigational safety and regulatory of shipping, the preservation of the 
environment of the coastal States, and the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution,123 Under the transit passage regime, straits States may establish traffic 
114 Article 19(2) of the 1982 LOSC. 
115 Article38(2)ofthe 1982LOSC. 
116 Article 380) of the 1982 LOSC, See previous discussion on rights and duties of user States above at 16-18. 
117 Article 25(3) of the 1982 LOSC. 
118 Article 44 of the 1982 LOSC. See previous discussion on rules governing innocent passage, above at 3-9. 
119 Article 39(l)(b)of the 1982 LOSC. See previous discussion on the law relating to transit passage, above at 
16-20. 
120 Article 38(3) of the 1982 LOSC. See also ChurchiSl and Lowe, above n 15 at 91. 
121 Article 42(2) of the 1982 LOSC. It is notable that these provisions were the subject of considerable debate 
during the negotiation of UNCLOS, as States such as Malaysia and Indonesia were particularly concerned 
over the impact the provisions would have on their ability to implement certain navigational requirements for 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, see Leifer, above n 70 at 113-121. 
122 Article 24(1) of the 1982 LOSC. Nevertheless, in both cases, foreign shipping are under aduty to comply with 
coastal States legislation, see Articles 21(4) and 42(4) of the 1982 LOSC. 
123 Artiele2l(f)of the 1982LOSC. 
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separation schemes and sea lanes in the case of navigational safety,134 and relate 
discharges of oil or other noxious substances in the case of marine pollution.133 
However, in practice, it is not clear that this more limited formulation would have 
much significance and particularly in the light of the detailed provisions laid down 
in the IMO Conventions.I26 
Rules on prohibiting regulation of design, construction and equipment 
Coastal States, under the rules of innocent passage, are expressly prohibited from 
regulating on the basis of design, construction, and manning of equipment, unless 
conforming with international rules or standards.137 The Convention is silent on 
the point with regard to transit passage, and the list of regulatory competence 
contained in Article 42(1) appears to be exhaustive.138 Nonetheless, it would be 
extraordinary in the context of the 1982 LOSC as a regulatory framework if straits 
States were prevented from legislating on the basis of international rules and 
standards as they can in other parts of their territorial sea. Again, therefore, there 
appears to be no significant change in the powers of coastal States. 
Rules on the designation of traffic separation schemes 
Before designating the traffic separation schemes or prescribing the sea lanes, strait 
States must refer their proposals to the IMO for approval. This means that the 
straits States can only have the power to make recommendations and can only 
implement those which are sanctioned by the IMO, in accordance with generally 
accepted international standards.129 This is stricter than the rules governing innocent 
passage, where coastal States need only take into account the recommendations of 
the competent international organisation, i.e. the IMO, when designating sea lanes 
and traffic separation schemes.130 On the otherhand, it promotes greater compliance 
134 Article 42(IXa) of lhel982 LOSC. 
125 Article 42< I Xb) of the 1982 LOSC. 
126 Detailed international rales and standards relating to navigational safety and prevention of marine pollution 
from vessels are discussed, inter alia, in the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collision 
at Sea 1972 (COLREG 1972), the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS 1974), the 
International Convention on Load Lines 1966(Load Lines 1966), and the International Convention on Standards 
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers [978 (STCW 1978), In addition, with specific 
reference to marine pollution control, the IMO has set down rules and regulations for vessel-source pollution 
in the International Convention on Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973/78). 
127 Articte21{2)ofU>e 1982LOSC. 
128 See Churchill and Lowe, above n 15 at 92. 
129 Article 41(4) of the 1982 LOSC. 
130 Article 22(3)(a) of the 1982L0SC. 
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because all straits traffic separation schemes will have been accepted 
mu Unilateral ly.131 
Rules on levying charges 
It is clearly provided by the 1982 LOSC that charges may only be levied for services 
rendered to ships exercising the right of innocent passage.131 The law is silent as 
far as transit passage in concerned, but this principle would appear to apply also to 
ships in transit.133 The ambiguity contained in this provision as to what kind of 
services can be charged for and the level at which charges can be set is, however, 
of particular importance to transit passage because of the greater need for 
navigational facilities in international straits, such as the Straits of Malacca. 
Conclusion 
The question to be asked is whether Malaysia should be concerned about the change 
from innocent to transit passage in the Straits of Malacca. The key issue, in the 
sense of its practical importance for the Straits of Malacca, is not so much the 
question of what constitutes innocent passage or transit passage as such, but whether 
the change in regime affects the power of straits States to regulate the conduct of 
passage. It appears from the above discussion that, in the context of commercial 
shipping, there have been some changes in form but no significant changes of 
substance as far as navigational safety and marine pollution are concerned. 
The 1982 LOSC contains the general principles relating to innocent passage and 
transit passage and gives very little detail on the extent to which such passage may 
be regulated.13" However, the Convention has an arguably more important function 
as the international legal umbrella under which a variety of new regulatory measures 
131 An example of this is the need for regulation of under keel clearance regulations in theTSS in the Straits of 
Malacca, in particular with the development of supertankers and the potential for grounding. The Malaysian 
government was able to obtain agreement from a number of major users of the Straits 10 an interpretative 
statement issued in 1982 which recognised the strait State's power to enact laws and regulations dealing with 
traffic separation schemes and determining underkeel clearance. The insertion of Article 233 of 1982 LOSC, 
recognising the rights of straits States to take certain action to intervene when vessels engaged in transit 
passage are causing or threatening major damage to the marine environment, represents a further worry, see 
Letter dated 28th April to the President of the Conference, 11 th Session, U.N. Doc. A.CONF.62/L 145. But, as 
a result of these initiatives, the strait Slates bordering the Straits of Malacca won some specific concessions 
for their concerns. See also K L Koh, Straits in International Navigatwn ,* Contemporary issues, (Oceana 
Publications Dobbs Ferry N.Y. 1981)158-160. 
132 Article 26 of the 1982 LOSC. 
133 See previous discussion on rights and duties of user States, above at 18-21. 
134 For example, there is very Little international Law that actually regulates vessels carrying hazardous cargoes. 
The 1982 LOSC contains some specific provisions, namely. Articles 19, 21 and 24, but these are not 
comprehensive and, only refer back to existing international standards. Article 23 of the 1982 LOSC provides 
that "foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious 
substances, shall when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, cany documents 
and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements. However, 
this provision does not authorise the coastal Stale to prohibit passage by vessels carrying certain inherently 
dangerous cargoes if they meet the standards of existing international agreements". See discussion in Roth well, 
above n 15 at 614. 
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certainty the procedure as well as the decision making process, and it is ineffective 
in the enforcement of the legal rulings. These shortcomings have, for a long time, 
been a constant source of concern in international relations.2 
Fundamentally, as this article attempts to show, these shortcomings stem from the 
difficulties encountered in designing an effective mechanism for the dispute 
settlement itself. Designing such a mechanism at the international level often 
involves difficult and intricate issues. In the first place, trade agreements, which 
are multilateral in nature, involve a complex interplay of domestic interests and 
conflicting interests between trading nations. This is compounded by the fact that 
these agreements often involve vague and ambiguous procedures. Thus, so far, no 
international mechanism of disputes settlement has fully satisfied the needs and 
requirements of the competing interests between states. 
The next difficult task of designing an effective dispute settlement mechanism is 
the formulation of the mechanism itself. Although, at present, abundant literature 
can be found on the general subject of dispute settlement mechanism concerning 
international trade, literature on designing the criteria for an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism in international trade remains yet to be developed. As such, 
until today there is no generally established rule and principle that can be accepted 
as a practical and workable guideline in formulating an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism, other than the dispute settlement systems established by WTO, NAFTA 
and CUSFTA. 
General theories and concepts of dispute settlement in 
international trade 
The viability of international rules is constantly being questioned, and for several 
reasons. First, international rules lack enforcement. This is especially so where the 
rules are vague and ambiguous. Second, international rules do not operate in the 
same way as national rules, where in the latter's case, the courts have the jurisdiction 
and liberty to apply various techniques of interpretation or construction. The doctrine 
of judicial creativity, for instance, provides forjudges in the common law jurisdiction 
to be creative in law making especially in situations where there appears to be a 
gap in the law or legislative inactivity. This may not be the case at the international 
plane, as different legal systems and other multilateral characteristics require careful 
consideration, as the decision would have political implications. Thus the perception 
of a rule as an ethical goal differs substantially in the two contexts. Third, at the 
international plane differences in language, culture, religion and political philosophy 
and ideology necessitate greater care in constructing any effective rule. This is not 
2 R ttudec, "TYajiscending the Ostensible: Sonne Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Govern-
ments" 72, Minn. L.R, (1987) 211-226, 
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the case in national laws where domestic complications in promulgating rules are 
less intense. 
Further, even if rules are being provided for at international level, there is no 
guarantee that the rules will be complied with fully. On the contrary, there is a 
tendency that the rules will be breached. Thus GATT, for instance, despite its many 
years of experience as an institution of international trade was criticised for its 
inability to maintain compliance with its rules. As Professor Jackson has rightly 
pointed out rules must be set in a framework of an effective legal system. The 
system must provide for application of the rules to particular facts, objective methods 
of determining those facts and trusted interpretations of the rules and methods by 
which these actions are kept consistent and reasonably predictable.3 Admittedly, 
however, although such a system is much anticipated there are numerous hindrances 
to its full realisation. 
Common law versus Civil law 
It has been the long-term goals of every international agreement, first, to achieve a 
reasonable degree of compliance with the obligations it embodies, and secondly, 
to resolve any dispute arising therefrom in such a manner where the integrity of 
the agreement is preserved. However, both of these goals are contentious because 
of the underpinning differences in the approaches between the common law and 
the civil law countries. The common law countries view international trade 
agreement like GATT as "creating binding obligations". The civil law countries, 
on the contrary, prefer a more flexible approach, where reliance is placed upon 
negotiations and consensus, which is premised on the principle that members should 
retain legal sovereignty and undiminished policy making authority. The United 
States and European Community's different approaches to GATT law respectively 
reflect the common law and the civil law countries' positions. 
In regard the international legal system, it does not subscribe to the common law 
principle that calls for the judiciary to operate on the doctrine of binding judicial 
precedent or stare decisis. This draws it closer to the civil law system which equally 
excludes the doctrine. Thus, originally, a GATT panel report is not considered a 
binding precedent, although there is certainly a tendency for subsequent GATT 
panel reports to follow their predecessors." When this happens antecedent panel 
reports have been cited as the reason in support of the finding. For example, the 
panel report on Japan - Trade in Semi Conductors* noted that the Contracting 
3 John H Jackson, "The Jurisprudence of International trade: the DISC case in GATT" 72 Am. J. Intr. L (1978} 
747. 
4 John H Jackson, "The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Significance and Challenges" in TP 
Steward, The WTO: Multilateral Trade Framework For the Twenty-first Century and US Implementing legis-
lation, (American Bar Association, 1996) 5-28, 
5 B1SD35S/116 
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Parties had decided in a previous case of EEC - Programme of Minimum Import 
Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables6 
that import regulation allowing the import of a product not below a minimum 
level, in principle, constituted a restriction within the meaning of Article XI, 1 of 
G ATT. The panel then considered that the principle applied in the case was equally 
applicable to restrictions on exports below certain prices. The recent 1996 report 
of the Appellate Body of the WTO on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 
constitutes a high water-point on the use of precedent in world trade disputes 
settlement.7 
Sovereignty in international trade 
The traditional concept of sovereignty views the states as the only sovereign entity 
in the international order, thereby denying the very existence of international law 
as law. This classical view of international law, founded on the principle of the 
sovereign equality where states could assert exclusive jurisdiction over activities 
within their territory, was based on the old concept of protecting the state from 
invasion. Accordingly, any framework for peaceful co-operation created among 
states is, from such a position, but an anathema and a sham, 
Unlike the classical international law, international economic law, on the contrary, 
finds its foundation not on the concept of state sovereignty, but the notion of 
economic interdependence. As such the classical view of international is no longer 
accurate to reflect the current reality, at least in the area of global and regional 
trade. Greater economic integration and interaction at international level are now 
altering the notion of sovereignty. In fact, state's obligations under economic 
integration arrangements have undermined much of states' ability to control 
activities within their territory. This rapid progress has also penetrated state borders 
thus making states vulnerable entities. Today even private citizens within states 
are becoming involved and directly affected by the economic forces beyond their 
country's boundaries.8 This rapid expansion in international trade calls for the 
comprehensive international framework of rules and order to enhance the 
management of international trade. The establishment of such a framework will 
provide a degree of order and certainty. Indirectly it reduces conflicts caused by 
6 B1SD s5i/68 
7 See the discussion in R S J Martha, "Precedent in WorldTrade", NILR (1997) 346-377. 
S The rise of private participation is now becoming more prominent in international law. There is a common 
trend in international law to regard individuals and business entities as subject of international law. In the 
human rights filed, international organisation provide direct access for individuals who claim human rights 
violations. The protection of foreign investment is also a field where private party participation plays an 
important role. See the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute between States and Nationals of 
Other States, done at Washington, 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966. The rise of private 
participation in new areas such as competition policy for instance is a field that largely governs private con-
duct. See Martin Lukas, 'The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round Agreements" 
J.W7:29No.5(l995) 181-206; see also M Bronkers. "Private Participation in the Enforcement of the WTO 
Law: The New EC Trade Barrier Regulation" 33 C. M. L Rev. (19%) 299-318 . 
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different application of regulations among states.9 Through the regional mechanism 
of disputes settlement, such as ASEAN, member countries can agree in enforcing 
uniform rules applicable to all member countries. 
Alternative to the above notion of sovereignty is one that arises from the different 
application of the dualist and monist paradigms. This concept provides that a state 
is neither wholly subordinated nor supreme to a distinct and co-existing international 
legal order. Nonetheless even such an idea of sovereignty, it will be later argued, is 
no longer appropriate within the present context and structure of international 
economic law. The dualist paradigm operates on the basis that national and 
international law co-exist as two separate and distinct entities. While international 
law is universally accepted as a valid and binding norm, it is at the same time 
restricted from transgressing state's sovereignty unless the law is transformed into 
domestic legal system through the legislative process of the state. Monism, on the 
other hand, presupposes the existence of a single system of international law norms 
binding upon states and an individual is the ultimate subject of international law. 
Hence, international law will be automatically incorporated and available as a 
domestic legal instrument. In terms of international economic law, both of these 
paradigms, however, are no longer relevant as countries are full-fledged participants 
in international economic activities. In other words, dividing the notion of 
sovereignty into two separate theories does not bear any significance in the eyes of 
international economic law, 
Yet another new challenge to state's sovereignty emerges from international treaties 
that regulate the various aspects of trade in services and intellectual property. Thus 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade Related Intellectual 
Property (TRIP) require the surrender of a certain degree of sovereignty by states 
to the international system and its institutions. 
Rule of law in international trade 
International trade perceives the "rule of law" as a necessity rather than an aspiration. 
It is a tool of modern diplomacy, particularly in international economic relations 
and matters. However, for the rules to work there must be a framework of an 
effective legal system, a system that provides for application of rules to particular 
facts, objective methods of determining those facts, trusted interpretations of the 
rules, consistency and predictability.10 As to extent the rule of law should govern 
international trade, however, there have been extensive debates between the 
protagonists of two schools of thought, the legalists and the pragmatists. 
9 See Susan Hainsworth, "Sovereignty, Economic [megiaiion and the World Trade Organisation" 33 No. 3 
Osgoode H. L J. (1995) 583-614. 
10 J H Jackson, "The Jurisprudence of Iniernational iiade: The DISC case in GATT' 72 A J.I.L. (1978) 74. 
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For the legalists, the non-legalist approach lacks the element of predictability 
because it reserves too great a role for negotiations of disputes with the prospect of 
diplomatic interaction and political compromise.11 For the pragmatists, on the 
other hand, they attribute the GATT's success largely to the non-legalistic approach 
it adopts in the application of rules. To them the principal value of GATT is that it 
provides a process through which trade problems are negotiated and compromises 
reached within a broad framework of rules. But such negotiations and compromises 
may not always be technically in accordance with strict law, as a court would 
apply it. 
The Post Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations saw the increase in the 
demand for rule of law in the organisation of world trade. The multilateral agreement 
contains provisions which are more precise than the GATT of 1947 and the Tokyo 
Round. 
However, it is generally conceded that even a rule-bound system in international 
trade relations does not necessarily demand that disputes must be settled only by 
means of adjudication. The consultation approach can still play an important role 
as it is the "natural" initial attempt to settle any dispute between states and it can be 
the cheapest, most confidential and the least adversarial form of disputes 
settlement.12 Similarly, maintaining rule of law is no guarantee that no trading 
nations would ever breach the rule. 
International trade governance 
The development of the world trading system is based on two incompatible theories; 
the economic free trade theory and the classic international relations theory of 
realism. Economic free trade theory basically emphasises real economic welfare 
based on the doctrine of comparative advantage. Global wealth increases if each 
state specializes in producing and exporting those goods and services that it is 
most efficient at producing. 
The international relations theory of realism, on the other hand, explains how states 
actually behave in their relations. Essentially, realism views states as the main 
actors in world affairs and they are autonomous, self-interested and animated by 
the single-minded pursuit of power. This interstate competition for power, in turn, 
creates anarchy. In such an anarchic situation, international law is "but a collection 
of evanescent maxims or a 'repository of legal rationalisations' and international 
co-operation arrangements have an unstable existence." 
11 PR Trimble, "International trade and the'Rule of Law"'83 Mich. L. Rev. (J985) 1018. 
12 See R Ostrihansky, "Settlement of Interstate Trade Disputes-Trie Role of Law and Legal Procedures", 22 
N.Y.LL. (1991)163-214. 
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Hence while the economic free trade theory stressed global trade usefulness in 
providing jobs, wealth and economic stability for most states, especially those 
states that were falling behind in the race for international power, the realist 
approach, instead, saw states as being exposed to economic and security threats 
even when they co-operated to adopt such measures as lowering trade and other 
protective barriers. The early development of dispute settlement in GATT saw the 
predominance of the realism despite the differences between the realists and the 
free traders over its use of diplomatic working parties rather than adjudicatory 
tribunals to settle disputes. 
Even though GATT system had become more procedurally complex and 
adjudicatory, it nonetheless still maintained the realist characteristic by empowering 
its defendants to veto dispute resolution panel decisions when they came to the 
GATT council for approval. 
The criteria of an effective dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
in international trade 
This article argues that in establishing the criteria of an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism in international trade three broad aspects would need to be addressed: 
the paradigm of disputes settlement mechanism, the characteristics requirement 
of the mechanism, and the structural imperative requirement of the mechanism. 
Paradigm of dispute settlement mechanism 
Gathering from the literature on the subject of the paradigm of dispute settlement, 
it can be discerned that the paradigm for any peaceful settlement of disputes can be 
looked at from several perspectives namely, the technique-based, the process-based, 
and the objective-based. 
(a) The technique based approach 
The technique-based approach refers to the various techniques suggested for 
disputing states to adopt in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The techniques 
can be categorised into three types: diplomatic means of dispute settlement, legal 
or judicial means of dispute settlement and, dispute settlement procedures among 
member states of international organisations'3. 
(b) The process-based approach 
The process-based approach emphasises on the processes of dispute settlement. It 
has three variants - a power-based approach, a right-based approach and, an interest-
13 P Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, (Routledge London 1997) 273. Shaw 
divided these techniques into two broad categories: diplomatic procedure and adjudication. See M N Shaw, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1997)717. 
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based approach.'4 These approaches were widely adopted in dispute settlement 
systems of the United Nations, which covered a wide range of disputes where the 
main objective was the avoidance of war. The three approaches are, however, often 
related, and in the process of resolving a dispute the focus may shift from one 
approach to another. As the United Nations was created with the main aim of curbing 
the excesses of power, the lesson learned from the devastating catastrophes of the 
two World Wars, the processes adopted by the body in dispute settlement were 
primarily based on a combination of rights- and power-based approaches. 
The power-based approach refers to the process where disputing parties would 
attempt to determine who is the most powerful through a power contest. War is the 
most obvious and extreme version of the power-based approach, though other less 
intense forms are also common. The Security Council of the UN, which was 
established as the organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, was given virtually unlimited powers to ensure "collective 
security" (the term that embraces the concept wherein all Member States will protect 
each Member State from external threat). 
The right-based approach, on the other hand, refers to a dispute settlement process 
where the parties try to determine who is "right" according to certain common 
standards under international law, such as treaties, conventions or accepted customs. 
It operates on the notion that throughout history, human communities have created 
rules, customs and laws to serve as a standard of conduct for their members for the 
maintenance of peaceful relations and avoidance of conflicts. However, where the 
rights themselves become the subject of a dispute the process may lie somewhere 
between the two approaches. And although an adversarial nature of a rights contest 
will inevitably strain relationship between the parties, its consequences are less 
serious than that in a power contest. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) plays 
an important role in a right-based approach of dispute settlement. However, from 
its inception in April 1946 until August 1994, the ICJ dealt with only 72 contentious 
cases and 21 advisory cases. The Court's ability to act as an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism is limited by Article 36 of the Statute of International Court 
of Justice which makes its jurisdiction optional. There are currently 3 ways for 
states to submit to the court's jurisdiction. The first is through the "optional clause", 
which is set in Article 36(2) of the Statute. The Article allows Member States to 
declare that they recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the court but they can 
also exempt certain areas from jurisdiction.15 The second is through the consent of 
a state to take a given dispute to the Court as part of a special agreement or 
14 Connie Peek, The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System: Intpriwitig Mechanisms far the Prevention 
and Resolution of Conflict (Kluwer The Hague 1996) 10. 
15 By August 1995, only 61 of the 185 Member Slates of the UN, less than 1/3 have agreed to the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause and many of these have limited its jurisdiction by making 
exception. Only 1 of the 5 Permanent Members of the Security Council (the UK) has currently endorsed the 
optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction, 
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compromis, as provided under Article 36(1). The third is through compromising 
clauses in treaty agreements which stipulate that any dispute arising therefrom 
must be referred to the Court. 
It has been pointed out that the right-based approach in many ways resembles the 
rule-oriented approach mentioned earlier. First, both approaches emphasise on the 
importance of legal rules in dispute settlement mechanism operating at the 
international plane. Secondly, both approaches will apply international law 
principles as the common standard of determining the "right" and the "wrong" of 
parties in a dispute. Thirdly, both approaches suffer the same consequence of 
inevitable result in the strained relationship between disputing parties. In respect 
of the practical significance of both the approaches at the international plane, the 
rule-oriented approach seems to be more prominent as compared with the right-
approach. This is evidenced by the fact that currently a rule-oriented approach is 
gaining ground in most dispute settlement mechanisms of international trade. This 
is true in the cases of the WTO, NAFTA and the ASEAN Protocol of Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, It is perhaps here that a convergence can be found in the 
approaches taken by both the UN system and the system of international trade of 
GATT/WTO. Thus, for instance, consultation prior to a panel ruling is still an 
important element in any trade disputes settlement. In most of the institutions, the 
mechanism of dispute settlement makes provisions for the institutions or any other 
body to offer good office and conciliation before proceeding to panel rulings. 
In contrast to the above approaches, an interest-based approach requires parties to 
attempt at reconciling their underlying interests by opting for solutions that will 
bridge their different needs, aspirations, fears or concerns in a manner that is 
satisfactory to both sides. 
(c) Objective-based approach 
The third perspective of the paradigm for dispute settlement is the objective-based 
approach. This approach lays stress on the objectives and goals of a dispute 
settlement paradigm and is found suitable in dispute settlement involving 
international trade. 
In terms of the cost-effectiveness of these approaches, the power-based approach 
tends to be the most costly of the three. Power contest consumes enormous amount 
of time, energy and money and when it escalates it often leads to enormous 
destruction of resources. Additionally, the approach relies on the factor of 
satisfaction with outcome. Hence, when the parties are satisfied with the outcome, 
future conflict is less likely to arise. On the other hand, unmet grievances and 
dissatisfaction can result in the recurrence of the conflict. The use of coercive or 
adversarial power-based tactics may also damage or destroy the relationship between 
the parties and thereby making resolution of the conflict more difficult. Interest-
based approach tends to be the most cost effective since it attempts to address and 
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meet the parties' underlying interests and to achieve a satisfactory outcome for all 
concerned, and it is unlikely to lead to the destruction of resources. 
An effective international dispute resolution system should offer ^step-wise process, 
where low-cost procedures are deployed as early as possible in a dispute, and 
resort to other more costly ones is undertaken only when they fail.16 In the case of 
the UN, for instance, since the interest-based methods are the least costly, they 
should be first employed. Only if they fail then the other methods, such as low-
cost rights- or power-based approaches, can be used as a backup. When these also 
fail, progressively higher-cost approaches can subsequently be deployed. 
It has been suggested that a functional system of dispute settlement should be 
structured to provide a full range of dispute settlement approaches. Such a system 
would attempt to apply low cost approaches as early as possible, in order to find a 
resolution before the dispute becomes costly to the disputants and to the system. 
Any systems that are not structured in a step-wise fashion with an early attention 
to dispute resolution often become "distressed". Distressed systems are those that 
allow disputes to go unresolved and, therefore, to be recycled over and over gain. 
Typically, a distressed system waits until the dispute has turned into a full-fledged 
conflict, and then it employs power-based procedures to impose a solution. But 
since the solution is not based on the parties' interests, one or both parties may 
remain dissatisfied and will either not comply with the outcome or will re-instigate 
the dispute in another form at a later time. 
Although in theory the Charter of the UN provides a range of dispute settlement 
procedures, in practice the body has never been able to fully develop into an effective 
dispute settlement system. The UN thus has resembled a distressed system, since 
many international disputes have gone unresolved and others have only been 
addressed when it was too late to stop their escalation into full-blown conflicts. 
Working paradigms of dispute settlement in international trade 
Broadly, the working paradigms of dispute settlement in international trade can be 
divided into two main categories. The first category (which is referred to as 
"objective paradigm") emphasises the goals or objectives of dispute settlement 
process, and the second category emphasises on the content of the trade agreements. 
The former demarcates firstly, the different approaches to dispute settlement 
mechanism between the rule-oriented approach and the power-oriented approach, 
and secondly, the different standpoints adopted by legalism and pragmatism on the 
subject matter. The latter category (which will be called the "content approach") 
outlines the strengths and weaknesses of soft law and hard law, and the various 
ways in which the norms of obligation and norms of aspiration are applied in trade 
L6 Connect Peck, above n LS at 13. 
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agreements. The discussion that follows will elaborate, firstly, on the two categories 
of dispute settlement paradigms in international trade by taking the historical 
overview of their evolution in GATTAVTO, and secondly, on their practical 
application in the G ATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures since its inception in 
1947. 
The "objective paradigm": Rule-Oriented and Power Oriented'7 
Professor Jackson has raised an important and fundamental question that needs to 
be addressed prior to any construction and evaluation of dispute settlement system 
at the international level.18 This fundamental question relates to the goal of the 
system: Whether the system should primarily be designed to adjudicate disputes 
or to mediate them. If adjudication is the goal, then the system must be able to 
apply the relevant rules consistently and ensure that the decisions it produces are 
implemented. On the other hand, if mediation is the goal, then a dispute settlement 
system must emphasize methods designed to encourage the parties in dispute to 
negotiate a solution to their dispute.19 
This proposition has created a long history of legal and philosophical debates among 
academics and practitioners of international trade. From his numerous writing on 
the subject,20 Professor Jackson has innovated two main techniques for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, namely the rule-oriented and power-oriented 
diplomacy. A rule-oriented system is one based upon a legally binding constitution 
setting out clear and precise rules and obligations enforced by an effective and 
impartial adjudication mechanism that aims to foster and establish a stable and 
consistent international legal order.21 The system is designed to ensure the highest 
possible degree of adherence and conformity to a set of rules. The power-oriented 
system, on the other hand, focuses on a dispute settlement system that facilitates 
states interaction characterized by negotiation, conciliation and compromise.22 
Underlying the system is the conviction that the purpose of dispute settlement 
17 Terminology coined by Jackson. 
18 John H Jackson, W J Davey, and A Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases. 
Materials and Text on The National and international Regulations ofTransnationat Economic Relations (SL 
Paul Minn, West Pub 1995) 328. 
19 Ibid at 327-328. 
20 For some of his writings see: J H Jackson, "Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs 
and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States" 82 Mich L R. (1984) 1570; Jackson, 'The Crumbling 
Institutions of the Liberal Trade System" 12 J.W.T.L. (1978) 93: Jackson, "Dispute Settlement techniques 
Between Nations Concerning Economic Relations-With Special Emphasis on G A I T in Resolving Transnational 
Disputes Through International Arbitration". Thomas, C., (ed.) Charlottesville University Press of Virginia at 
39-72; Jackson, "Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT ' 
13 J.W.T.L. (1979)1; Jackson, "The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT", 72 Am. 
J. I n t ' L , L . (1978) 747; Jackson, "The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Significance and Chal-
lenges" in The World Trade Organisation: Multilateral Trade Framework For the 2ht Century and (Z.5. 
Implementing legislation. TPStewanLT.P, f c i i J (A .B .A . 1996)5-28. 
21 Above n 9 at 590. 
22 Ibid at 590. 
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procedures in international economic organisation is not so much to decide who is 
right and who is wrong, or to determine a state's responsibility or culpability in the 
matter. Instead, the aim is to proceed with the dispute in such a way so that even 
serious violations can be terminated as quickly as possible. Thus while the main 
objective of a dispute settlement is for a rigorous application of law, adjustment of 
divergences between states must be allowed to enable them to find equitable 
solutions. 
Critics of the rule-oriented approach have argued that the system will encourage 
conflicts and contentiousness in an international organization that seeks to promote 
negotiated solutions to achieve its goal. As such the rule-oriented system is viewed 
as counter-productive because it poisons the atmosphere in which negotiations are 
possible. Three reasons were given as to how this can happen. First, the publicity 
that it attracts, second, the act of filing the complaint which constitutes a contentious 
act, and third, more cases will result in more unresolved disputes. Professor Jackson, 
however, is not convinced by these reasons, as they are not compelling enough to 
displace the arguments in favour of the rule-oriented approach. In turn he counter-
argues that the emphasis on negotiation is likely to lead to some countries to use 
their relative political and economic strength to take advantage of the weaker 
countries. In contrast, the rule-oriented system stresses on rules, and rules tend to 
treat everyone in the same fashion. Negotiated settlements, instead, tend to favour 
the party with the best negotiating position, which often will turn out to be the 
more powerful party. For this reason, therefore, the smaller countries find favour 
in the rule-oriented system, as they perceive they will be treated fairly under such 
a system.2i 
Another strong objection to the rule-oriented system is, however, made on the 
ground that the system wilt result in "wrong" cases being brought into the system. 
Such instances can arise into three situations: firstly, when the government 
unavoidably violates a rule of international trade policy itself; secondly, when the 
matter involves old outmoded rules; and finally, where governments use the panel 
procedure for reasons that are more political than legal. 
In the light of the above controversies, it may be said that, perhaps the most appealing 
reason for diplomatic or negotiation approach lies in the fact that it leads to an 
equitable arrangement which is satisfactory to both the parties to the dispute and to 
the institution itself. The smooth functioning of the institution is always the main 
concern of the organ responsible for settling disputes. Judicial approach, on the 
contrary, is not always able to safeguard the spirit of the understanding and 
collaboration required in an institution. 
Notwithstanding the above criticisms against the rule-oriented approach, there are 
at least two situations where it prevails over the power-oriented approach; the first 
23 Ibid at 330 
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relates to private individuals right, and the second concerns reforms in the dispute 
settlement system. 
As the world becomes more economically interdependent, private individuals will 
ultimately become directly affected, either in terms of their jobs, business or daily 
life, by the forces outside and beyond the national boundaries. A rule-oriented 
approach thus allows private individuals in the future a better opportunity to plan 
their action and pursue legal suits on a more predictable and credible dispute 
settlement system. 
The extensive reforms, which took place resulting from the Uruguay Round, which 
led to the formation of WTO and DSU seem to suggest that the rule-oriented and 
adjudicatory paradigm have clearly found favours among members of the 
international community. Additionally, the appellate review of panel decisions by 
a permanent appellate body where appeals are limited to issues concerning law 
indicates the significant role played by the appellate body in bringing consistency 
and uniformity to the interpretation of the international norms enshrined in the 
WTO constitutional base. In this way it is opined that the dispute settlement system 
of the WTO will create an authoritative body of jurisprudence on question of law 
concerning covered agreements.24 
Legalism and Pragmatism 
Another controversial point in regard the dispute settlement system in international 
trade arises from the contrasting position that the legalists and the pragmatists 
have taken in the way the system should operate. Like rule-oriented and power-
oriented paradigms debate, the legalist-pragmatist dichotomy has permeated the 
GATT history since its inception. 
Kenneth Dam has used the term legalism as to refer 
... to an approach to the drafting of international agreements under which 
draftsman attempt to foresee all of the problems that may arise in a particular 
area ... and to write down highly detailed rules in order to eliminate to the 
greatest extent possible any disputes, or even doubts, about the rights and 
obligations of each agreeing party under all future circumstances.25 
Dam is generally critical of the detailed code approach taken in the drafting of the 
General Agreement. He charges that a certain type of "legalism" dominated the 
drafting of the General Agreement. And this legalism rested on a "naive" notion of 
law for it tended to view law as substantive rules. Instead, he points out, 
24 Aboven9at617-6!8, 
25 For the arguments and benefits ofthe Legalistic system, see JH Jackson,''Perspectives of International Trade: 
Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedure in the United States'* 82 Mich L R (1984) 1570-1583. See also R E 
Hudec, "GATT or GABB?The Future Design of the GATT' SO No. 7 Yale L.J.( 1971)1299. 
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... law is not solely, or even primarily, a set of substantive rules. It is also a set 
of procedures, adapted to the subject- matter and designed to resolve disputes 
that cannot be foreseen at the moment when those procedures are established. 
Perhaps more important than settling disputes, taw viewed as procedures and 
process serves to identify the common interest in complex situations and to 
formulate short-term policies for the achievement of long-term objectives... 
Dam, on the other hand, uses the term pragmatism to refer to an approach to rule 
making where "emphasis is placed on mutual agreement on objectives, and rules 
concerning rights and obligations are considered formalities to be avoided whenever 
possible." 
Against this view, the legalists believe that the pragmatic approach fails to achieve 
the necessary predictability because it emphasizes so much on negotiation in settling 
disputes with the aid of diplomatic intervention and political compromise. The 
GATT system requires stability and predictability and, therefore, rules must be 
clear and the best way of ensuring this is through a system of impartial adjudication. 
Also in support of a legalistic system is the argument that the system promotes 
compliance with rules better than a negotiated system. In relation to GATT/WTO 
the legalists claim that such a system would promote the compliance with its rules 
in two ways. First, at least in theory, the system would discourage the infringement 
of the rules. Infringement is here perceived as costly in relation to states' future 
negotiations over trade issues and benefits, and in terms of their reputation for 
being labeled as a rule violator. By contrast, in a negotiated system, the cost is 
considered inconsequential as, at most, it may only create an unpleasant diplomatic 
exchange. Secondly, adjudicative approach produces more panel decisions. In this 
way compliance with GATT/WTO rules will improve since panel decisions tend 
to be implemented, if not sooner, then later. In practice, compliance with the dispute 
settlement decisions that the Council has adopted is encouraging. Hence, as the 
number of decisions increases, the obligations of GATT/WTO members will become 
clearer and better defined. 
Although the appeals to legalism may seem compelling, there are nonetheless 
practical limitations to the strict application of substantive rules in dispute settlement. 
In reality, hence, not all rules can be applied strictly and fully in dispute settlement 
cases. Admittedly in the face of such hard reality many of GATT/WTO obligations 
still remain general and vague. Strict application of rules can inhibit successful 
negotiations, whereas political and diplomatic compromise can achieve a better 
outcome. Similarly, too much emphasis on legal rules can undermine the credibility 
of the very mechanism for the dispute settlement. The DISC case, for instance, 
offers a good illustration on the point. 
"Content approach ": norms of aspiration and norms of obligation 
According to Professor Jackson, one of the features in international organisation 
that tends to complicate the issues relating to the rule of law in international trade 
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is the confusion and ambiguity created along two separate normative paradigms 
namely, the "norms of obligation" and the "norms of aspiration". "Norms of 
obligation" designate those norms toward which a person or a country should feel 
oblige to follow. This feeling of obligation may stem from an idea of moral duty or 
a pragmatic recognition of consequences that might follow if the norms are broken. 
From this point of view the terms in an agreement are more than just a mere 
"statement of purpose or objective". "Norms of aspiration", on the other hand, 
involve a mode of conduct that everyone thinks is desirable, but toward which 
there is no feeling of obligation. 
In practice, the main weakness of the "content approach" paradigm lies in its 
tendency to commingle both normative categories in the same instrument. And 
this can render the interpretation of the instrument difficult and contentious, as 
some countries will consider a particular phrase to be a "norm of obligation" while 
others will treat the same phrase to be a "norm of aspiration". This can certainly 
add tensions and disputes in international affairs. 
The application of both normative approaches can be seen in GATT, They 
discernibly cut across many of its provisions. The most-favoured-nation treatment 
obligation, the obligation of national treatment on internal taxation and regulation, 
and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions are clear examples of the norms of 
obligation. On the other hand, the rules introduced in 1966 in favour of the 
developing countries, which areembodied in Part IV of GATT, constitute the norms 
of aspiration. As pointed out earlier, one obvious weakness that this approach has 
given rise to in GATT is that the boundaries between the two normative categories 
are often blurred and this causes different legal interpretations as to the actual 
meaning of the norm. 
Hard Law and soft Law 
Generally, all laws, domestic or international, possess three important elements 
namely, a normative statement of what is prohibited or encouraged, a self-
characterization of legitimacy or authority, and a manifestation of the lawmaker's 
intent to make the norm effective. Hard law, as the name suggests, requires the 
commitment of parties to make legal statements effective; possesses the authority 
to make binding agreements with other states; and embodies the intention of the 
lawmakers to make the agreement effective. In sum, hard law denotes a binding 
agreement enforceable by law, be it domestic or international. 
The term "soft law"2* is normally applied to international norms that contain a 
mixture of ethical and political values or economic claims in a form not traditionally 
26 Fordelailedexplanaiionof Soft Law see, OElias and C Lim, "General Principles of Law; 'Soft* law and (he 
Identification of International law" VX VIII N.Y.I.L. 3-49 (1997);CMChinKin,"The Challenge of Soft Law: 
Development and Change in International Law" 38ICLQ ((989) 850; J Carlson, "Hunger. Agricultural Trade 
Liberalisation, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal dimension of a Political Problem", 70 No. 5 
Iowa L.R. (1985) 1200. 
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regarded as a source of international law. The term is also applied to international 
instruments that do not purport to be binding on the nations accepting them. Soft 
law is thus rather inchoate in nature. It embraces international norms that reflect 
principles or values, but do not create legal obligations. Sir Joseph Gold describes 
the essential ingredient of soft law as". . . an expectation that the states accepting 
these instruments will take their content seriously and will give them some measure 
of respect .,,"" He also postulates three other elements of soft law, namely, "its 
legitimacy" as promulgated "is not challenged"; its "quality as law" is not destroyed 
because failure to observe is not a breach of obligation; and "conduct that respects 
soft law cannot be deemed invalid"}% Two attributes of soft law norms thus lend 
themselves some semblance of a legal character: firstly, the international consent 
to the norms, which gives them an authoritative base; and secondly, an international 
expectation that the norms will be taken seriously, which communicates an intention 
that nations will adhere to the behavioral values expressed in the norms. 
In the current situation of mounting political and economic pressures, international 
trading system is showing a greater preference for a flexible and soft rule to replace 
the rigid rule that tend to undermine international co-operation in international 
trade. Unlike hard rules, soft and flexible rules permit or accommodate temporary 
and limited deviations from the important norms, while at the same time assuring 
that the basic norms retain their force. 
Generally, therefore, the obligations to enforce international agreements are intended 
to be vague and ambiguous. The soft law language, as opposed to that of the hard 
law, is often chosen to designate the norms as "guidelines" or "declarations of 
principles" such that compliance with the norms is "voluntary", or that the nature 
and degree of adherence to the norm is a matter of national discretion. 
Further, even where the norms are being supported by an expectation that the states 
accepting them will take their content seriously and will give them some measure 
of support, they can still be considered "soft law" in either of two circumstances. 
First, the norms are soft when the obligation they impose is so vague in its intention 
that it is impossible to determine with certainty what behavior is expected or 
required. Secondly, the norms are soft if, notwithstanding their clearly stated 
normative standard, there is only a weak command for national compliance with 
the standard. Hence, "soft law" may include any international norm that is 
characterized by an unclear policy content or a weak command for national 
compliance with the international policies expressed in the norm. 
27 Gold, "Strengthening the Soft Internationa] Law of Exchange Arrangements" 77 Am. J. [nt+L( 1983) 443. 
28 See ibid for Cold's analysis on soft law in relation to exchange arrangements and exchange rates in the inter-
national monetary system and some of the consequences of the softness of that law found in Article ] V of the 
Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
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Soft law has been found to be most useful in situations where the inability of states 
to reach an agreement on the general principles of international relations threatens 
to block negotiations on the practical details. The purpose of adopting a soft law in 
such a case is thus to create a norm that would deflect any discussion or debate on 
the disputed issue of principle therely creating a space for states to proceed to 
addressing and reaching agreement on the practical issues raised in their 
negotiations. For instance, when states disagree on issues involving territorial 
sovereignty they may keep themselves deliberately ambiguous to avoid resolving 
the conflicting territorial claims while still reaching agreement on how the claimed 
sovereignty is to be exercised. Deliberate ambiguity through soft law may, therefore, 
serve the laudable function of permitting nations to reach binding agreements on 
appropriate international behavior without forcing them to bind themselves to any 
particular interpretation of the broader legal principles applicable to the subject 
matter at issue. It is a matter of practice in international affairs that states seldom 
agree on firm rules governing the practical details of their relations. Instead, 
agreements are reached on vague or ambiguous general principles neither specifying 
how those principles are to be achieved nor stating a clear command for adherence 
to those principles. In trade and economic relations particularly, soft law functions 
to avoid large issues of principle so that an agreement on matters of details can be 
reached. 
Criticisms have, however, been raised against such a use of soft law in international 
relations. While at first brush it may appear to reconcile disputes in a principled 
manner, what it in fact does is simply postpones a solution, legal or otherwise. In 
that regard soft law may only create an illusion of progress toward resolving 
international problems. Again, although soft law depends on an "implicit" common 
intent, there may be no clear "common understanding of a soft norm". As a 
consequence the "common intent" may be misunderstood. In such a case it would 
fail to guide states to conform to an internationally acceptable behavior, and may 
instead be used to defend behaviour or behaviours that undermine the very 
framework of which it is a part. 
It is also pointed out that soft law's qualities - an unclear content or a weak command 
- are not of a nature that suggests they will effectively influence national decision-
making or contribute to national compliance with international policy goals. First, 
an international judgement declaring that a national conduct violates a norm will 
not be clearly and emphatically made if the norm is itself unclear in content or 
weak in command. The lack of clarity may ipso facto imply that the international 
community does not view the norm as representing a particularly important 
principle. Second, a soft norm's ambiguity or vagueness may permit individual 
nations to legitimize their non-compliance with the norm by offering justifications 
that partially avoid or blunt international criticism. Aclearer rule would often make 
it obvious that such justifications are illegitimate. Third, ambiguity and vagueness 
in a norm may create non-reciprocity in its underlying legal obligation. This can 
hinder a national willingness to comply with the norm as well as the international 
willingness to condemn its violations. 
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From a practical viewpoint, soft law is perceptibly not in a position to attract the 
same degree of support from the domestic forces, as would a firmer rule. Difficulties 
in interpreting the ambiguous rules and the ability to offer justifications for ignoring 
soft law's weak commands would undermine the force of arguments that those 
domestic interests might offer in support of such rules. 
To summarise the preceding discussion the following points can thus be made: 
First, any trade agreement should provide some guidelines relating to the mechanism 
of dispute settlement. Whether the dispute settlement system favours negotiation 
or rules depends upon the objective/s the system seeks to achieve. 
Second, while power-oriented, soft law, pragmatic and anti-legalist approaches 
have the tendency to achieve a settlement of disputes through the negotiation 
process, rule-oriented, hard law and legalistic approaches tend to bring it about 
through judicial process. 
Third, it is not possible to have an entirely rule-based system in an international 
mechanism of dispute settlement, as there are situations where power-based 
approach still dominates. On the other hand, it is also not practical to have an 
entirely power-based system without rules system. 
Fourth, all the working paradigms can be applied in any dispute settlement 
mechanism, although not in their entirety. 
Characteristics requirement for an effective dispute settlement mechanism 
The characteristic requirement for an effective dispute settlement mechanism is 
derived from the notion that there is a natural tendency among states to treat 
international legal instruments as though they operate in the same way that domestic 
legal institutions would: there will be a plaintiff and a defendant; a legal claim, a 
tribunal and a legal ruling at the end of the trial.29 Thus, in its ideal situation, the 
characteristics of an effective dispute settlement mechanism should include the 
following:30 
i. A formal mechanism. 
ii A prospective orientation. 
iii A compulsory jurisdiction. 
iv A sovereignty-impinging quality. 
v An effective compliance. 
29 Above n 2; see also Peter Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement (BuUerworth 
London 1984), 
30 The discussion in this part draws a few of DS Sullivan's observations on effective dispute settlement mecha-
nism and its correlation with the liberal democracy, see DS Sullivan, "Effective International Dispute Settle-
ment Mechanism and the Necessary Condition of Liberal Democracy" Bl G. L.J. (1993)2369-2412. 
96 
ESTABLISHING THE CRITERIA FOR AM EFFECTIVE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The five characteristics invariably resemble and share the qualities, functions and 
legitimacy of those of domestic judicial bodies, and are generally in tandem with 
the general notion of how a truly effective adjudicatory tribunal," either at domestic 
or international levels, is suppose to operate. It follows, therefore, that first, both 
international and domestic judicial bodies are established by governments for future 
disputes settlement process. Secondly, parties to disputes governed by both types 
of tribunal do not have the option of refusing to accept their jurisdiction. Finally, 
decisions from such judicial bodies are generally obeyed.31 
Thus said, it must be pointed out that while all the above features fulfil the 
requirement of a domestic legal institution for an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism, they may not, however, be well accepted by states at the international 
level. The sovereignty-impinging and effective compliance characteristics, for 
instance, are frequently disputed and subjected to criticisms both in international 
law generally and in international tribunals. In themselves, both of these 
characteristics are ineffective and, in many ways, a sham. The reluctance and 
unwillingness of state parties to submit themselves by conforming to these 
characteristics can be justified on several grounds." Firstly, states are unwilling to 
take the chance of losing, particularly when the dispute involves important or vital 
national interest. Secondly, a judicial settlement is essentially a win-or-lose, zero-
sum game, thus explaining why many disputes are resolved through negotiations. 
Thirdly, there is a general reluctance, and for good reasons, for parties to entrust a 
third party with an important decision. In light of these shortcomings, it is 
understandable that so far only a few international institutions that deal with dispute 
settlement mechanism have fulfilled the entire characteristics requirement. The 
following discussion will outline how this requirement is generally treated in states' 
dealings. 
Formal Mechanism 
This characteristic requires states to initially establish some form of formal 
agreement. This is not a difficult task to undertake since most international 
institutions, which establish trade agreements, will also institute a formal mechanism 
of dispute settlement. Viewing the matter from the perspective of international 
trade paradigms as discussed earlier, whenever a formal agreement requires 
observation and adherence to rules, then it is imperative that the characteristic 
fulfils the requirement of the rule-oriented approach. Whereas, if the formal 
agreement contains rules where the obligation to comply with the agreement is 
vague and ambiguous, the characteristic will fall into the category of soft law. 
31 CW Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication (Stevens, London 1964) 13. 
32 For a discussion on adjudication generally, see Lon L Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" 92 
Harv. L. R. (1978) 353-409. 
33 Foe a discussion on limitations of adjudication, see R B Bilder, "Some Limitations or Adjudication as an 
International Dispute Settlement Technique" 23:1 Vir. J. Inter. Law (1982) 1-12. 
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Prospective orientation 
Prospective orientation means that the main function and purpose of a DSM 
established by the parties to the agreement must be to adjudicate and settle disputes 
that might arise in the future, that is, after and not before the formation of the 
DSM, This characteristic confirms the general rule regarding a treaty application 
where, unless a different intention appears from the text or otherwise established, 
it is not retrospective and will not bind a party in respect of any act or fact which 
took place before the treaty entered into force.^4 
Compulsory jurisdiction 
This characteristic requires that the parties be subjected to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of a DSM. It essentially refers to the capacity of the mechanism to 
govern the parties involved in the agreement. Admittedly, as highlighted earlier, 
one of the difficult challenges of international institutions is to convince members 
to agree in submitting their sovereignty to a higher structure. As such, even in the 
case of the International Court of Justice, for instance, member states are given the 
option to choose whether or not to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
While at the national level compulsory jurisdiction is privileged to operate well 
through a legislative process, there is no similar process at the international level. 
Notwithstanding the above limitation, however, the requirement of compulsory 
jurisdiction is seemingly met by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). There are at 
least three instances to support this observation. First, in several provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome it is stated that the ECJ "... shall fiave the jurisdiction..." (Articles 
173,178-82). Second, Article 177 requires all domestic courts to refrain from making 
an appeal to request for preliminary rulings from the ECJ. Third, through its 
decisions and judgements, the Court itself, not the Treaty of Rome or other 
Community law, has determined that the Community law takes precedence where 
it conflicts with the laws of any member state. 
Sovereign-impinging quality 
Sovereign-impinging quality or nature of a DSM means that a tribunal is given the 
jurisdiction and mandate to make rulings on matters that have traditionally and 
exclusively been made within the sovereign realm of a state. Specifically, it means 
a tribunal or a panel has the mandate to rule upon the legality of states' laws as well 
as the validity of states' application of their own laws if those laws violate a relevant 
international agreement. 
The ECJ fulfils this characteristic requirement in the sense that the Court has the 
mandate to rule upon the legitimacy of a state's domestic laws and to render them 
34 Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
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incompatible with international obligations. The two most important decisions of 
the Court in establishing the supremacy of the Community law over other laws can 
be found in Case 26/62, Van Cend en Loos v. Nederlandse Belastinga Administratis 
and Case 106/77, Amministrazione della Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p,A,36 
Effective compliance 
Effective compliance would require all contracting parties to trade agreements to 
strictly observe the rules stated therein.37 Non-compliance will result in punishment, 
which, in all probability, will be in the form of compensation. 
However, the vexed question that arises in relation to this characteristic requirement 
is How can the effectiveness of the mechanism be measured? One way in which 
this can be done is by analysing what would have happened in the absence of such 
a system.38 This may lead one to observe how the contracting parties in an 
international agreement comply with the system. However, the general observance 
of the rules cannot be a definitive proof that the rules have been effective. This is 
because there is still a possibility that even in the absence of the rules, states would 
not have behaved differently. Similarly, a departure from the rules does not have 
any bearing on non-compliance either, for the simple reason that there is no way of 
comparing empirically the instances of compliance with those of non-compliance. 
Such an empirical limitation unavoidably leads to the conclusion that "a critical 
question for any study of compliance is what presumption to adopt."39 From this 
perspective, the question of whether states really comply with their international 
obligations depends on the strength of the arguments put forward in support of one 
presumption or the other. Hence, on the basis of such considerations the presumption 
adopted is that contracting parties normally comply with international rules/norms. 
First, an international treaty is binding upon the contracting parties on the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, which is codified in Article 26 of the 'Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties. Apart from this maxim, a general principle of law 
common to all the legal systems would require a state to comply with any 
international agreement or treaty. Second, the strongest evidence for this sense of 
obligation is the care that states take in negotiating and entering into the treaties. 
Third, as in GATT, rules observance is perceived to be in the national interest, 
while non-observance is considered "cost" in terms of reduced national welfare 
and additional political costs. Finally, the basic principle of classical international 
law stipulating that states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent 
35 (]963)E.C.R. 1,1963 CM. L.R. (1963) 105, 
36 (197S) E.CR. 629: 3 C.M.L.R. (1978) 263. 
37 For a discussion on compliance at international law, sec S M Schwebel, "The Compliance Process and the 
Future of International Law" in Schwebel, Justice in International Law (Cambridge 1994) 598. 
38 For the notion of effectiveness, see Pieter Van Dijk, "Normative Force and Effectiveness of International 
Norms" 30G. Y.B. 1. L. (1987)9. 
39 The rationale behind this argumentation has been borrowed from M M Mora, "A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins 
Over Politics in Resolution of International Trade Disputes" 31 Colum. J. Tranil.L, Vol.31 (1993) 103-180. 
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and accord tends to make the rules they are obligated to carry out reflective of their 
interests. 
Notwithstanding the above complexities, however, the ECJ has fulfilled the effective 
compliance criterion. Article 171 of the Treaty of Rome provides that when the 
Court determines that a member state has failed to fulfil its treaty obligations, the 
state is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgement of 
the Court. In addressing enforcement issues, the Court has issued a general ruling 
of non-compliance as well as detailed specifications of what a member state must 
do to be in compliance with an ECJ judgement. 
Contrariwise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as an international DSM, 
apparently does not meet the criterion of an effective DSM. Essentially, many 
members of the ICJ have declined to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court. And in the recent years, whenever ICJ issued decisions on certain disputes, 
particularly those which were political in nature, parties had been reluctant to abide 
by such decisions. 
In light of the foregoing elaboration, the practical significance of the characteristics 
requirement as a component of the general criteria requirement of a dispute 
settlement mechanism in international trade can be viewed from two different 
aspects. Firstly, the characteristics requirement can operate as an indicator to 
determine whether the mechanism of a dispute settlement is correctly formulated 
based on the five factors or qualities just mentioned. Although it has not been 
possible for most states to adopt the sovereign impinging and compliance factors 
in trade agreements that require the formation of dispute settlement mechanism, it 
is still imperative that they realise that those factors are complied with for a 
mechanism to operate effectively. Secondly, as a practical alternative, even where 
it is not possible for the dispute settlement mechanism to fulfil all the characteristics 
requirements, the three factors (formal mechanism, prospective orientation and 
compulsory jurisdiction) can still be useful as a general guideline for designing an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism. 
Structural imperative requirement of an effective dispute settlement mechanism 
The structural imperative requirement criterion for an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism in international trade is based on the notion that such a criterion would 
allow a better designing of the mechanism. To this end, Reisman and Weidman are 
of the view that the mechanism designing process should be informed by the 
following considerations: 
1. DSM is imperative for all parties in trade agreements. This is without regard 
as to whether they are a weaker or a stronger party to the agreement. 
2. The deeper the mutual economic interdependence, the greater the intensity of 
this imperative. 
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3. The features and the political setting of the actual agreement dictate the de-
sign of the dispute settlement mechanism. This includes the following; 
i. The scope (either ambitious or comprehensive) of the economic exchanges 
called for in the agreement; 
ii. Their durability through time; 
in. The number of participants; 
iv. The degree, intensity and effectiveness of the internal support for and the 
opposition to the agreement in each party; and 
v. The degree of resulting economic integration between the parties.40 
4. Trade agreements generate their own dynamic through their operation. 
Underlying the above considerations is, primarily, the contention that, in 
international relations where the situation is such that parties are on equal footing 
and mutually dependent, they will normally share a common interest in having a 
compulsory, neutral, third party and non-disruptive dispute settlement mechanism 
as an effective means of settling disputes. This is because, as interdependence 
increases, any disruption of the economic relationship may hurt both parties, 
economically and politically.41 
Notwithstanding this, it is generally assumed that in a situation where parties are 
not on a "level playing ground", which is often the case in international dealings, 
the stronger party will have an interest to evade a neutral, third party dispute 
settlement mechanism. And indeed in a situation where a formal mechanism is 
absent, it will fully advantage the stronger party as it will be able to exploit its 
dominant position. Hence, on the basis of such assumptions, the stronger states, 
whether in a multilateral or a bilateral agreement, should resist or decline the 
inclusion of a meaningful dispute settlement mechanism. However, this intuitive 
assumption is of doubtful general validity. And it is still less convincing and credible 
in terms of comprehensive trade agreements between states where their aim is for 
a high degree of economic integration and mutual dependence. 
The above proposition also takes cognizance of the internal and external political 
factors that can influence the designing of an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism. The more comprehensive the scope and participation the agreement 
commands and the greater the interdependence it generates, the more urgent will 
be the requirement for the designing of a centralized, neutral and binding decision-
making mechanism. Conversely, the more limited its scope, participation, duration, 
and integrative consequence, the weaker will be the incentive to create such a 
mechanism. Furthermore, there is in such a circumstance a room for the stronger 
parties to dictate the direction of the mechanism. 
40 M Reisman and M Weidman, "Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Some Hypotheses 
and their Applications in the Uraguay Round arri NAFTA" 29 J. W.T. 5 (1995) 10. 
41 Ibid at 9. 
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Underlying the proposition above is also the notion that every trade agreement 
will have positive and negative impacts on the participating states. Once an 
agreement begins to operate, the dynamic that expands the positive impact should 
come into play. Invariably, free trade agreements should have a growing and positive 
impact because ambitious trade agreements are supposed to make national economy 
more robust and productive. Effective dispute settlement mechanism is, therefore, 
a critical factor in the operation of these free trade agreements, and the more 
comprehensive and effective the agreements, the greater will be the demand for 
the mechanism. However, the optimistic view of free trade agreements is subject 
to potential threats by other non-participating states on the ground of comparative 
advantage or competitive position. But a compromise in this situation may be found 
in the soft law approach.43 
Summary 
Instead of a conclusion, this article proposes to make a summary of the above 
discussion. What have been covered are two important issues in the area of dispute 
settlement. The first relates to the importance of the general working paradigms of 
dispute settlement systems. It is a fundamental principle in any dispute settlement 
system that parties must first agree on what type of approach they should adopt in 
the event of a dispute arising between them. Should they agree on rule system or 
co-operate and negotiate? Thus it is imperative that in designing a mechanism of 
dispute settlement, the objective of the process be made clear. Equally important is 
to emphasize on the content of the agreement. Will the parties agree on a rule 
based principle or a compromise on a soft law approach? Both approaches, as 
discussed, have their strengths and weaknesses. 
The second issue focuses on the designing of an effective mechanism of dispute 
settlement specifically in international trade agreements. To this end several criteria 
have been proposed. They comprise three broad components namely, the working 
paradigms, which form the main thrust of the criteria, the characteristics requirement 
and the structural imperatives, which would enhance the effectiveness of a dispute 
settlement mechanism. These three components are highlighted as they are 
representative of the current thinking on the subject of dispute settlement system 
in international trade. 
43 Ibid at 14; see also Gbenga Bamodu. "Legal mechanism of Transnational Economic Co-operation: Interna-
tional and European Dimension" in C Harding and C Lim (eds,), Westphalia Revisited: A New Model of 
European International Law ( KluwerLaw International The Hague 1999) 240-241. 
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